Mountain howitzers were involved in several of the more important engagements of the early period of the war in the east. In mid-June the Union forces were sending forward large reconnaissance parties. Two howitzers, belonging to the 2^nd New York Infantry, accompanied 1,500 men of the 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th New York Infantries that were sent to Big Bethel, Virginia. The Confederates continually skirmished with them as they neared Big Bethel. The Union soldiers discovered that the Confederates had dug in on the edge of a wooded area. They formed to attack with the howitzers, and other artillery, sent a little farther up the road towards the enemy. The artillery opened fire as the infantry moved forward to assault the Confederate works. They were repulsed with heavy loss, at least heavy in terms of the early battles. The howitzers helped to cover the retreat of the Union troops from this early Confederate victory.⁽¹⁾

The artillery of Wade Hampton's Legion, under a future-Lieutenant General Stephen Dill Lee, was equipped with a pair of mountain howitzers while it awaited the arrival of a battery of Blakely rifled guns from England. Hampton used his power to get six guns for his battery while awaiting the arrival of the Blakeleys. These guns included four mountain howitzers and two rifled guns, all provided by the Tredegar Ironworks of Richmond. The battery missed the Battle of First Bull Run/Manassas, but were soon assigned to man the Freestone Point Battery on the Potomac River. They were attacked on September 25, 1861 by six, wooden, river-gunboats. The Legion's fire was more effective than that of the gunboats, but in the end they had to give up on blockading the Potomac and pulled back closer to the main Confederate lines along Powell's Creek. On November 9^th the battery traded in their guns when their Blakeleys finally arrived from England.⁽²⁾

James McMullin and the four mountain howitzers of the 1^st Ohio Battery were involved in a skirmish near Carnifix Ferry in West Virginia on September 10, 1861. An infantry brigade was dispatched to drive off a large group of troublesome Confederates who were entrenched along the nearby Gauley River. In the middle of the afternoon the Yankees advanced on the Confederate trenches only to be met by a hail of gunfire and cannon rounds from a six-gun battery. The Union's four howitzers, and two rifled guns of another battery, shelled the right of the Confederate line with devastating accuracy. Union Brigadier Henry W. Benham ordered two regiments to attack the Confederate's right with the artillery firing continually in support. The attacking Union soldiers were decimated by fire from the Confederates and their artillery. Their losses included one colonel killed and one wounded, as well as several other field officers wounded. The mountain howitzers were credited by General Benham with performing very well, but the Yankees were unable to carry the Confederate works and eventually retreated back to their own starting point near Summersville, West Virginia.⁽³⁾

The second large battle of the war occurred at Ball's Bluff, Virginia. Union forces had withdrawn from much of Virginia after the disaster at Bull Run to train and recruit. Just after midnight on October 21, 1861, General Charles Stone's men began to cross the Potomac near Leesburg. These men began digging in as more and more troops were transported over the river. Among the Union forces was Battery I, 1^st U.S. Artillery which had two mountain howitzers, and an unassigned rifled 12-pounder. Five companies were sent to seize the town of Leesburg at 2:30 in the morning. All of the Confederates in the area had been withdrawn to oppose another Union advance, except for one company of Mississippi infantry. The Mississippians stood behind a fence just outside of town and opened a destructive fire on the Yankees, killing and wounding 25 before their first man was wounded. This Union force soon retreated nearer to the main body when they witnessed Confederate artillery advancing through Leesburg. Two other Mississippi companies soon joined their comrades and helped drive the Union soldiers even closer to their main force. By early morning Confederate reinforcements were rushing to the area.

The Mississippians and the 8^th Virginia Infantry advanced towards the Union lines taking only a few losses while inflicting a large number of casualties on the enemy. The Confederates continually sniped at the Union lines, picking off many of their officers. Two more Mississippi regiments soon reached the field and the Southerners planned to attack the Yankees, who were drawn up in a horseshoe shape with the artillery in the middle. The howitzers were kept firing by volunteers long after their crews had been picked off by the Confederate marksmen. Colonel Edward Baker was killed and the rest of the Union men broke and ran for the river. Some tried to act as a rearguard, but most ran for their lives. Many of the men were killed in the mad dash down the steep hillside of the Bluff, and others were drowned in the scramble to get across the river. Panic filled Yankee soldiers swamped two boats filled with wounded men, killing all of them. Over a thousand men had died in this minor engagement, most during the retreat. Also, the victorious Confederates captured all three of the artillery pieces, which would equip Southern units later on in the war and be used with devastating effect against their former owners.⁽⁴⁾

The advancing Yankees attacked the Confederate's Fort Magruder, which was manned by a small infantry force with Stuart's cavalry as support. The Rebels held up the Yankees while Stuart's cavalry and howitzers attacked them on their flanks.⁽⁷⁾ Pelham placed his two howitzers and a 12-pound Blakeley rifle on the right side of Fort Magruder. He kept up a heavy bombardment on the Union forces until the arrival of General A. P. Hill's brigade, that was sent back by James Longstreet to help stop McClellan. Pelham then moved to the far left where he could fire directly into the Yankee flank. The Blakeley's elevating screw broke, but the howitzers stayed at this position until 5 p.m. After a short period of hard fighting the Yankees pulled back to the nearby woods, leaving behind a number of casualties and prisoners. All told during the battle the two mountain howitzers fired 286 spherical-case rounds and four canister rounds. The howitzers played an important part in slowing McClellan's advance and stopping them cold in front of Williamsburg.⁽⁸⁾

Vawter's Virginia Battery used two howitzers in West Virginia on May 10^th. The Confederates were defending the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, and the Dublin Depot. Brigadier General Henry Heth united several scattered cavalry and artillery units to attempt and retake the crossings on the New River from West Virginia and nearby Giles Court-House. Heth's men advanced on the 9^th towards the Union forces. The Yankees held a strong position along a ridge-line one mile from the Court-House. The Confederates easily drove them from this position and all they way through the town. The Yankees tried to rally to hold the New River Narrows, one of the few easy crossings from West Virginia. The artillery opened fire on the Union soldiers and quickly broke their resistance. According to General Heth the two howitzers were extremely accurate and destructive, one of their shells alone killed four Yankees. The Confederates drove the Union force back into the western half of West Virginia and eased their threat to the vital Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.⁽⁹⁾

Henry Heth continued his campaign in May, 1862, in West Virginia. With 2,000 men, 100 cavalry and three artillery batteries he fought around 1,500 Union soldiers, 150 cavalry and two mountain howitzers at Lewisburg. The smallest Union regiment was sent out from the town to stall Heth and allow the rest of the force to retreat. The howitzers, which could have provided a needed support, were part of the retreating force and played no part in the battle. This small Union force caused a larger Confederate battalion to fall back in a panic and this enabled the rest of the Union force to retreat unmolested.⁽¹⁰⁾

As a part of Stonewall Jackson's wildly successful Valley Campaign a battery of mountain howitzers, on pack-carriages so they could be broken down onto mules for movement, was assigned to him under Major John D. Imboden. Jackson wanted the howitzers for the fighting at Port Republic. He felt that the light-weight guns would be useful for blasting General Shields out of the mountains around the town. However, the guns are not believed to have seen any action because their mules acted poorly under fire. They tried to shake off their loads, but they were too securely attached to their backs to come off easily. So instead the mules rolled around on their backs to scrape off the artillery pieces. The gunners were never able to get the guns into combat because they spent all of their time fighting the mules. According to Jennings Cropper Wise, the foremost historian of the Army of Northern Virginia's artillery:

While the battery did not accomplish much from a military standpoint, it afforded rare amusement to the men of the Infantry. With the air of men seeking technical information, they would seriously inquire whether the mules or the guns were intended to go off first, and whether the gun was to fire the mule, or the mule the gun. In the estimate of Jackson's artillery at Port Republic, Imboden's Battery was not included, for under the circumstances its guns could not be properly classed as effective ordinance.⁽¹¹⁾

The howitzers, and their recalcitrant mules, were eventually sent back to Richmond. There the mules were sent to transportation units and the guns were either used to arm other artillery units or melted down to make larger guns at the Tredegar Iron Works.⁽¹²⁾

One of Pelham's two mountain howitzer went along on the Jeb Stuart's first ride around McClellan on June 12-15. Stuart assembled portions of the Jeff Davis (Ga.) Legion, 1^st, 4^th and 9^th Virginia Cavalries and two artillery pieces from Pelham's battery. The guns were intended to quickly break up any resistance to allow the command to continue the reconnaissance expedition. The Confederate cavalry encountered only disjointed attempts to capture them and very little resistance overall, and the artillery pieces were never used on the ride. The guns easily kept up with the fast-riding cavalry and completed the expedition when the cavalry force returned to Richmond.

Robert E. Lee easily forced the much larger Union army to leave its positions close to the Confederate capital by attacking their flanks and playing on George McClellan's fears of the supposedly huge Southern army opposing him. As McClellan retreated Lee had to try and figure if he was heading for the York or James Rivers, either of which would allow naval support and withdrawal. Jeb Stuart and his cavalry were sent towards the York River hoping to stop the Union from moving that direction. Stuart cut the York River Railroad, but received orders from Lee to chase the Union forces which were now known to be heading to the James River. Before he could move out he ran into a Union gunboat at the White House, home of Lee's son, Rooney, and Stuart decided to attack the Yankees. At first he deployed 75 skirmishers with the best rifles to fire on the gunboats, but when the gunboats opened fire with their 11-inch guns he sent for John Pelham.

Pelham was only able to bring up one of his small mountain howitzers, but it would soon drive off the Yankee ship. Three companies of the New York Volunteers were put into rowboats, and sent towards shore to drive off the annoying skirmishers. However, just then Pelham opened fire on the USS Marblehead with his tiny cannon. One shell landed on the deck and that was enough for the captain in charge of the Union fleet. He recalled his infantry, and as soon as they were aboard he headed downstream so fast that he capsized and ruined one of his cutters. Pelham chased the gunboat downstream firing the howitzer at it often. Stuart reportedly laughed so hard at the sight of a powerful gunboat fleeing from a solitary howitzer that he was unable to ride. The Southern horsemen then regrouped and headed off in pursuit of the rest of McClellan's retreating army.⁽¹³⁾

One of Pelham's two mountain howitzers shelled Union forces from Evelington Heights at the end of the Seven Days Battles. By July 3^rd George McClellan's grand army had retreated to the James River where they could be supplied by boat and receive the artillery support of the Union gunboats. Evelington Heights had been mistakenly left unguarded by the Union army. The Heights were a ready-made artillery position that would allow the Confederates to shell the Union army with impunity from their gunboats. After the hard fighting of the Seven Days John Pelham had only one serviceable cannon left, a mountain howitzer. Stuart and Pelham saw the importance of the Heights and quickly occupied them with most of his brigade and the one cannon. Pelham was ordered to open fire with his howitzer, and caused widespread panic among the Union teamsters and the horses. Stuart believed that Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet were nearby and rushing to reinforce his hold on the heights. Eventually Union soldiers and a lack of artillery ammunition forced Stuart and Pelham to retreat and Union soldiers occupied the Heights in numbers. This ended any chance of destroying the Yankees huddled along the James River. It was not until the next day that Jackson and Longstreet were close enough to reach Evelington Heights, but by then the Union army had too strong a grip on the hills to be dislodged.⁽¹⁴⁾

On July 21^st a force of Union infantry, cavalry and artillery was sent from West Virginia to occupy Luray in the Shenandoah Valley. By late that same day they had taken the town without even seeing any enemy soldiers. Early on the 22^nd a force of infantry, along with four companies of the 6^th Ohio Cavalry and its two mountain howitzers was sent to scout the region around the Columbia Bridge and the White House Ford. At the ford the howitzers and some infantry ran into a force of 20 or so rebel cavalrymen. A few shots were exchanged, but the howitzers opened fire on them and a couple of rounds sent the cavalrymen fleeing to the south. The Yankees destroyed the bridge and retreated. The expedition discovered that the Valley was occupied by only a few companies of Southern horsemen and nothing else.⁽¹⁵⁾

On August 25^th the 6^th Ohio and its two mountain howitzers moved out again as part of Colonel John Beardsley's brigade as it did another reconnaissance in northeastern Virginia. At the town of Warrenton Springs they ran into Confederate cavalry who opposed their advance. The howitzers were brought forward to drive the Rebels out of the town. The Southerners brought up a battery of their own, and as its guns were of larger caliber it soon drove off the 6^th's howitzers. Beardsley's men were able to discover that Jackson was heading through Thoroughfare Gap, on his way to attack Union General John Pope's flank in the extremely successful Second Manassas Campaign. However, by the time they arrived back at the main force of the Union army the battle had already begun. The brigade's howitzers and cavalry played no part in the Battle of Second Manassas.⁽¹⁶⁾ After the brigade's first reconnaissance Union soldiers had re-occupied parts of the Valley, but Stonewall Jackson would soon capture or chase away many of them in the Sharpsburg Campaign. Howitzers were rapidly proving to be unable to cope with longer-range guns on traditional battlefields. In the two main theaters of Virginia and Tennessee they were beginning to be phased out.

A mountain howitzer using a distinctive pack carriage fought in the Battle of Second Manassas. Stonewall Jackson had formed a defensive line in the shape of an upside-down fishhook, running roughly southwest to northeast with the hook at the northern end. He had assigned the tough Light Division under Ambrose Powell Hill to hold the hook at the left end of his line. The first series of Union attacks on August 29^th fell on Hill's division. A small hill formed the middle of the Hill's position and the key to Jackson's line. Five Union divisions made repeated assaults on Hill's men and at times pushed into their lines, but they were never able to drive away the Confederates. Some of the hardest fighting of the war occurred in this small stretch of land. Brigadier General Maxcey Gregg held the far left of Hill's position, and after a lot of back and forth fighting they were able to push back the attacking blue-coats towards the end of August 29^th. As Gregg's men looked out over the fields they were surprised to see a mule cropping the grass calmly in the middle of this field. They were even more surprised to see a mountain howitzer attached to the back of the mule. This gun had come forward with the advancing Union infantry and its double-canister charges had mowed down many Confederates. This was using a howitzer to its greatest advantage. Its light weight enabled it to move easily up hills, and could have been evacuated even if the horses or mules pulling it had been killed. However, in the panic of being driven back the Yankee soldiers just left the howitzer behind.⁽¹⁷⁾

Major General Joe Hooker used several as he attacked the middle of Jackson's line. After one disastrous attack the retreating Union soldiers were being hard pressed by the Southerners. A battery of mountain howitzers from Robert C. Schenk's division, still on the backs of their mules, was rushed forward to stop the Rebels. Hooker's men found the sight of the battery to be highly amusing in spite of the battle that was raging around them. Despite the amusing nature of the battery it proved its worth by stopping the Confederate skirmishers who had pursued Hooker's men. According to Brigadier General Carl Schurz the howitzers were later lost, but they had bought time for Union officers to rally their men.⁽¹⁸⁾ The howitzers were of too short a range to be a major factor in the battle though, and they could not stop Major General John Pope's poor tactical choices from causing the Union army to be routed and chased back to Washington, DC.

To locate the Army of Northern Virginia after the disastrous Battle of Second Bull Run (Second Manassas), various groups of Union infantry were sent on reconnaissances throughout northeastern Virginia. The 80^th New York was on one such patrol through the region around Centerville and Fairfax Court-House. In the late afternoon of September 1^st they occupied the Little River Turnpike about two miles from Fairfax. Just after they arrived a Confederate force also arrived and opened fire on them. The infantry skirmish continued for two hours with little change in the relative position of the two sides, until a force of Confederate cavalry arrived with a mountain howitzer. The howitzer was run up to within 200 yards of the Union lines, where it opened a heavy rain of canister on the Yankees. However, it was soon driven off by Union sharpshooters who killed and wounded several of the gunners. A longer-range gun soon arrived and opened fire from three-quarters of a mile away, much safer for the crew than the short-range howitzer. In spite of the fire of the cannon to which the Yankees could not respond, the 80^th held on to the turnpike. By 10 p.m. reinforcements arrived and the Confederates withdrew.⁽¹⁹⁾

In September Union forces were being quickly driven out of all of the separate parts of Virginia. In the western third of the state, today's West Virginia, Confederate forces were massing to chase off the Yankees. The 34^th and 37^th Ohio Infantries were stationed at Raleigh Court-House with four mountain howitzers and two larger cannons, all under the command of Colonel E. Siber. Other regiments were massed at other possible points of advance for the Rebels. When he learned of the Confederates finally advancing the district commander, Colonel J. A. J. Lightburn, ordered the 34^th, 37^th and their artillery to fall back to Fayette Court-House, and the other units to other towns closer to the Ohio River. On September 10^th the 34^th and 37^th were attacked at Fayette by a large force of Confederate cavalry. They were quickly surrounded, but Col. Lightburn rushed several units of Virginia (U. S.) and Ohio infantry to their aid. The whole force was then ordered to fall back to Gauley, West Virginia if they could not hold Fayette. The reinforcements caught up with Siber's men on the road to the Kanawha River and Fayette, who were having to fight a continual rear-guard action against the advancing Southerners. Time and again the howitzers kept the Rebels at a distance and helped Siber's Yankees to make an orderly withdrawal.

On September 11^th the 47^th Ohio Infantry and its battery of mountain howitzers set up just outside of Gauley to help cover Siber's retreat. The howitzers fired continuously for several hours and forced the Confederates to stop until they could bring forward artillery to oppose the Union guns. Both group's howitzers enabled an easy withdrawal from Gauley. Siber's men and the other units continued their fighting withdrawal all the way to Charleston, West Virginia. On the 13^th all of the guns amassed along the Elk River to try and stop the Rebels. The howitzers moved continually around the field of battle to help contain any Confederate attacks. They moved swiftly and easily, and wounded large numbers of the Confederates. In spite of the bravery of the Union soldiers the men were forced to abandon Charleston and retreat even closer to the Ohio border. However, it was an orderly effort with only a little of the Union stores lost and none of the artillery.⁽²⁰⁾

Several mountain howitzers were involved in the Antietam Campaign. Colonel Thomas T. Munford had been assigned with his Confederate cavalry brigade and a mounted battery to hold Crampton's Gap against the surprisingly rapid advance of McClellan's Army of the Potomac. A section of the Portsmouth (Va.) Battery was assigned to assist him and their equipment included two naval howitzers, the Navy's version of the mountain howitzer, which was used for any operations on land. The cavalry and the howitzers skirmished with the advancing Yankees for several hours. Eventually they were reinforced by four infantry regiments from two different Confederate brigades. They repulsed numerous Yankee assaults. Munford's battery and the section of the Portsmouth Battery were removed after a few hours because they had fired every round of ammunition that they had with them. After several hours Munford's cavalrymen and the infantry were pushed out of the Gap, but they had held it long enough for General Lee to begin re-assembling his widely scattered divisions. They began regrouping at a small town known as Sharpsburg, Maryland.⁽²¹⁾ On the same day 24 Union mountain howitzers were captured when Harper's Ferry surrendered to Stonewall Jackson.

Jackson had surrounded the Union-depot town with very little opposition. Early on the 15^th they opened artillery fire on the town from the heights surrounding it. Just as the Confederate infantry began moving forward to assault Harper's Ferry the Yankee garrison surrendered. The Confederates held 11,000 prisoners; took 73 pieces of artillery, including the 24 howitzers; and hauled away tons of much-needed supplies and ammunition. Jackson left Ambrose P. Hill to quickly parole most of the Northern soldiers and started a detachment southward with the captured supplies and prisoners. Jackson's men then rushed to rejoin Robert E. Lee at Sharpsburg.⁽²²⁾ Unspecified Union howitzers possibly fought on the 17^th at Sharpsburg, Maryland. Colonel John B. Cumming, of the 20^th Georgia Infantry, reported that his men on the far right of Lee's line at the bridge, later named after Union Major General Burnside, were shelled by mountain howitzers. As Burnside's corps advanced to take the bridge they opened fire on the Confederates with much of their artillery, including several mountain howitzers which were rolled forward by hand to the Union skirmish line. There are no Union report indicating that they even had any mountain howitzers at the Battle of Antietam, much less used them in the battle. Many infantry and cavalry units on both sides often kept one or two howitzers for the added firepower and ease of movement, and these were often not listed on official records because they were not attached to officially sanctioned artillery batteries. However, they would have been ideally suited for lobbing shells at the Confederate sharpshooters who were dug in on the hillside behind the bridge, as opposed to longer-range guns which fire on a flatter trajectory which could not harm the sharpshooters without a direct hit.⁽²³⁾

At Blue's Gap, West Virginia Confederate Brigadier General John Imboden had a mountain howitzer. Union forces were moving back into the western and northern parts of Virginia after the Confederate retreat from Sharpsburg, Maryland. A Union raid was sent after John B. Imboden, the commander of the Confederate cavalry in West Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley. Imboden had just captured a small Union garrison, but was being pursued by 500 Union cavalry. They failed to catch up to him, but they did capture his camp and all of its equipment. Among the supplies captured from Imboden were two brass mountain howitzers, three wagons full of rifle ammunition, 100 rifles, and all of its clothing and stores.⁽²⁴⁾ The main target of the Union advance was the re-taking of important towns, such as Charleston. Siber's brigade of Lightburn's Division used howitzers as it attacked nearby Confederates on October 29^th at Charleston, West Virginia. They had one battery of rifled guns and one of mountain howitzers. The greatly out-numbered Confederates retreated without much resistance.⁽²⁵⁾

Stuart's Horse Artillery used a mountain howitzer at Upperville, Virginia on November 2^nd. Stuart was in the midst of yet another raid into the rear of the Union army. On the 2^nd they ran into a force of infantry and cavalry with 6 to 8 artillery pieces. Stuart posted his men behind stone fences to receive the enemy. They were outnumbered, but John Pelham and the Stuart Horse Artillery went a long way to equalizing the odds. The cannons held their position for most of the day, suffering heavily, but keeping the Yankees away. Pelham took a mountain howitzer alone to a hill on the Union flank. He opened fire on a body of Union cavalry waiting in a valley for a chance to gallop into Stuart's men. The Yankees used their numbers to force the Southern cavalrymen to withdraw, but they contested every foot of ground. They finally withdrew to the main Confederate lines with only a few losses, while inflicting large losses on the Union cavalry in men, horses, supplies and prestige.⁽²⁶⁾

Howitzers were widely used with Burnside's force in North Carolina. The 3^rd New York Cavalry used two of them at New Berne on November 11^th. Reports had been received that a large Confederate force of infantry, cavalry and artillery was moving to attack Union-held New Berne. The 3^rd New York Cavalry and its two howitzers went out on the Neuse Road to attempt to gain better information on the Southern army. The howitzers kept the Rebels at bay, but the Southerners were in such large numbers that the Union pickets were withdrawn to the town's fortifications without a fight. Within a day the Confederates pulled back several miles, and the pickets resumed their normal posts. Colonel Thomas Amory, commanding New Berne, planned to place one or two mountain howitzers with the pickets so that they could be better able to hold out against any large raiding force the Confederates might send against them.⁽²⁷⁾

The 3^rd New York Cavalry and its two mountain howitzers were sent on December 15^th on the road from Kinston to Goldborough to capture any stray Confederates that they might find and to distract the local Southerners from a large raid occurring south of Kinston. Nine miles from their base at Kinston they ran into a few cavalrymen and heard a train coming from Goldsborough. They fired five rounds of spherical case from their howitzers to complete the impression of a larger force being there. They later learned that the train had withdrawn fearing a Union attack. North Carolina was a neglected theater as far as the Union war effort went. Bigger, longer-range guns went to other armies, and the units in North Carolina were stuck with mountain howitzers. The howitzers did their job successfully in the marshy and heavily-forested stretches along the coast, where bigger guns might not have been so easily moved and used.⁽²⁸⁾

By the start of 1863 the main Union and Confederate armies in the theater had mostly phased out the short-range howitzers. Many of them would continue to be used in lesser important areas of Virginia, such as in West Virginia, by guerrillas, and by the forces fighting along the Atlantic Coast. At Kelly's Store, Virginia unspecified Union howitzers fought on January 30^th. Confederate forces had moved into the Union-held coastal plain to hold new areas open to foraging and to maybe retake some of the coastal towns that had earlier fallen to the Yankees. A Southern force under Brigadier General Roger A. Pryor was sent to hold the Federals at bay around the port of Suffolk and allow the foragers to move about the area unmolested. The Suffolk commander, John Peck, assembled a large force of 2,000 infantry, 500 cavalry and a number of cannons, including two mountain howitzers, to attack Pryor's Southerners. Brigadier General Michael Corcoran led the Union army out of the Suffolk defenses on January 30^th before dawn. Just after 3 a.m. the two forces collided near Kelly's Store. Union cavalry easily pushed the Southern pickets back to their main battle line. Then as the two sides amassed facing each other all of the artillery on both sides opened fire and dueled until 6 a.m., without any serious damage to either army. The Union infantry lined up to attack, but Pryor's men did not await the attack and instead retreated quickly. The Yankees pursued them until 10 a.m. when they ran into a marsh, where the Confederates had dug in. The Union force stopped for two hours to eat lunch and resupply the men with ammunition. During this lull the Confederates continued their retreat without being attacked. The Yankee cavalry skirmished a few more times with the Southern rear-guard, but no large battles occurred and no artillery was involved after the early morning fight. By late on the 30^th the Union force headed back to Suffolk having accomplished its mission of driving off Pryor's men and interrupting the Southern foraging efforts.⁽²⁹⁾

Mountain howitzers were still found in Robert E. Lee's defenses on the heights outside of Fredericksburg. They were easily moved around the hillside and were very effective against charging masses of infantry, and it would not be a big loss to the Southerners if they happened to be captured. Lee withdrew most of his men from the heights to attack Joe Hooker's main force in the Wilderness around the small hamlet of Chancellorsville. He left behind Jubal Early with only his division and a few brigades to hold their works. Hooker had hoped that the Confederates would abandon their works and had hoped to seize the town and their works while they were gone. The Union VI Corps, under John Sedgwick, moved across the Rappahannock River to seize the lightly defended Confederate works and to move on to attack Lee's main force from behind. At dawn on May 3^rd the VI Corps crossed the river and seized Fredericksburg.

The 56 Confederate artillery pieces fired continually on them. Howitzers had been placed behind the famous stone wall on the left of Early's lines. At 300 yards they opened fire, mowing down large numbers of Northerners. The Yankees were repulsed several times, but eventually the Union's superior numbers told and the Southerners were driven from their works. Thomas Neill's 3^rd Brigade, 2^nd Division, VI Corps attacked the middle of the Confederate line and after a long, brutal fight seized the flag of the 18^th Mississippi Infantry and several cannons, including one brass mountain howitzer. Sedgwick continued east to attack Lee's rear as planned, but Robert E. Lee had already contained Hooker and dispatched five divisions to attack the VI Corps. In the end Sedgwick was stopped and forced to retreat to Scott's Ford to their north, and most of the captured Southern guns were retaken by their owners.⁽³⁰⁾

One of the most famous users of mountain howitzers was "The Grey Ghost" John Singleton Mosby. He used one of them at Catlett's Station, Virginia on May 30^th. Mosby had long been raiding Union supply depots, wagons, detachments and trains throughout northeastern Virginia. In order to allow Mosby to cause more damage and tie up larger numbers of Yankees, who might otherwise be attacking Robert E. Lee's army, the Virginia raider was given a mountain howitzer that had been captured from the Union army in 1861 at Ball's Bluff. For their first use of the gun Mosby set up an ambush for a Union supply train outside of Catlett's Station. They displaced a rail on the tracks and waited for the next train. A supply train began slowing when they noticed that a rail was missing. Mosby's men wheeled out the howitzer and opened fire.

One of the shells ripped through the boiler, causing a huge explosion of steam around the engine. The Rangers then rushed forward, grabbed as much of the Union supplies as they could, and raced away. Three companies of Federal cavalry pursued them closely. A short ways from the ambush 40 of Mosby's men stopped in the road and loaded the howitzer. They fired it a couple of times, but the Yankees got in close and Mosby's Rangers had to abandon the gun. However, they had destroyed a train, looted much of its cargo of supplies intended for Hooker's army, and increased the Union fear of John S. Mosby because he now had more men and even artillery. This access to field guns led to the detachment of many more Federals to guard their supply lines through the region known as Mosby's Confederacy.⁽³¹⁾

A mountain howitzer was used in one of the most bloody, and important, battles of the whole war at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. As two divisions of James Longstreet's 1^st Corps moved forward to attack the 3^rd and 5^th Corps defending the Round Tops on the far left of the Union line. A mountain howitzer was used in the fighting around Devil's Den. First Lieutenant Page, 3^rd U. S. Infantry, remembered a mountain howitzer being in the thick of the fighting. He said:

The rebels came from all directions for the guns, and lost all formation. They waved their battle-flags, a dozen being just in front of me. They came to where a number were shot down; then they recoiled, and retreated through the wheat field and woods. To my right and rear, among the rocks, I could see a twelve-pounder mountain howitzer at work. A soldier asked me what kind of a gun it was; he said it kicked over at every discharge.⁽³²⁾

Once again this howitzer is not listed in the army's records or in the single most comprehensive look at the use of artillery in the battle, Fairfax Downey's The Guns of Gettysburg. An infantry brigade more than likely held onto the gun, because of its extra firepower. The howitzer would have easily moved through the rocky landscape of Devil's Den and given the defenders a better chance to hold the Round Tops. This flipping over was a common design problem that always plagued the pack carriage. Its small axle-width allowed the gun to turn over rather than roll backwards as most guns did when they were fired. The howitzer's canister rounds each contained around one hundred .58-caliber balls and would have cut wide swaths through the advancing ranks of John Bell Hood's division.

Brigadier General Julius White led parts of the 65^th Illinois Infantry, 10^th Kentucky Cavalry, Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, 14^th Kentucky Infantry, 39^th Kentucky Infantry, and Company M 2^nd Illinois Light Artillery, in all about 950 men. They moved from eastern Kentucky into Confederate-held portions of West Virginia. They were ordered to scatter the local Southern forces and to destroy as much of the railroad at Bristol as possible. After Julius White's men skirmished on the July 6, with Southern pickets they went on to attack Gladesville, West Virginia on the 7^th. There was some hard street-to-street fighting, but soon the Southerners were fleeing the town. The two howitzers of the 2^nd Illinois only fired a couple of rounds. The battle was over so quickly that the artillery was not needed to break the Rebel resistance. There were a few more light skirmishes as the brigade burned track, destroyed food supplies and chased away many Confederates. As a testament to how light the fighting was for the Federals in the entire campaign Julius White's brigade lost only nine wounded and none of those were seriously hurt.⁽³³⁾

The 1^st South Carolina Artillery Regiment was officially assigned to man Fort Sumter and all of its guns in early 1861. A mountain howitzer was stationed at the fort to repel any assaults by ground forces on Sumter. They endured the continual bombardments of 1862-1863 and drove off Union warships trying to enter the vital harbor. During the bombardment on November 7^th the mountain howitzer was struck by a shell and the bore was bent, but the commander felt it could be easily remedied by re-boring the piece.⁽³⁴⁾

Union forces held many Atlantic Coast towns. From these bases they raided inland, destroying railroads and tons of supplies, and protecting pro-Union people living near them. In December cavalry patrols were sent out to bring in to the Union lines the families of Confederate deserters who had joined the Union army. 50 men of the 12^th New York Cavalry, and one of its four mountain howitzers, were sent out to rescue the family of a Unionist North Carolina volunteer. They ran into a determined Confederate force blocking a bridge across the Chincapin Creek near New Berne, North Carolina on December 16^th. The Confederates destroyed the bridge and fired on the Yankees, who could not cross the creek's steep banks under fire. The howitzer fired 18 shots during the brief fight and lost one cannoneer killed. After a half hour of fighting the 12^th New York was forced to withdraw without bringing in the family of the volunteer. The howitzer was effective in moving through the dense North Carolina woods with the fast-moving cavalry, but it could do nothing about a destroyed bridge and steep banks which prevented the soldiers from crossing the creek.⁽³⁵⁾

In North Carolina the Confederates made constant, harassing attacks on any Federal outpost that seemed vulnerable. On February 1^st they attacked a small post, with only one officer and 13 men, eight miles from New Berne. The guards had taken up the planks on the Batchelder's Creek bridge that they were guarding and held up the Confederates for several hours. However, the Southerners eventually crossed downstream and captured the small garrison. All the while the outpost was fighting Federal reinforcements were rushing their way. They had reports that the Southern force was led by George Pickett and included 5,000 infantry and 16 cannons, but it is doubtful that there were more than a couple of thousand in a few, small brigades and one or two four-gun batteries attacking the Yankees. By noon the Rebels were closing on New Berne from all sides. The cavalry, including the 12^th New York Cavalry and its two howitzers, were placed at Brice's Creek, south of the town, to stop the Confederates.

Soon Southern horsemen appeared and the artillery opened fire on them. The fire of the dismounted cavalry and the howitzers in the front line stopped cold the Rebel advance. When darkness descended the Confederates had made no attempt to attack, because of the heavy fire from the Union lines. Other Rebel forces had seized parts of the Federal defenses, and even captured and later burned the U.S.S. Underwriter, and captured several, smaller Union-held towns. However, the intense fire of the cavalrymen and their two howitzers kept the Confederates from taking New Berne, the object of the attack was a port the Confederates needed badly. The town was also the center of Federal operations in North Carolina.⁽³⁶⁾

The 16^th Virginia Cavalry spent the winter of 1863-1864 successfully raiding behind Union lines in West Virginia, as they had all of the previous winters of the war. Many of the men were from the region so they were able to operate with near impunity. Union forces repeatedly chased them, but rarely encountered the 16^th and on even fewer occasions killed or captured one of the elusive Rebels. On January 26^th Major James H. Nounnan and 40 men headed out on a raid of towns along the Kanawha River. A scout learned on February 2^nd that the Federal transport, B. C. Levi, was anchored at the tiny river town of Red House, near Winfield. They learned the steamer was carrying Brigadier General Eliakim P. Scammon, commander of the Union 3^rd Division and the counties of West Virginia that the 16^th operated in. The frozen river and darkness forced them to tie up there, but the captain neglected to post any guards on the frigid evening. The raiders stole a small rowboat to cross the river and walked easily to the transport without causing any alarms to sound. Twelve men captured the steamboat without a fight. Scammon was captured as he exited his quarters, along with three other officers and 25 enlisted men.

The Rebels took the ship down-river at dawn, and took some of the medicines stored onboard. The raiders did not steal the $1,600 in private funds being carried to Charleston, West Virginia, but they smashed the ship's 6-pound cannon and burned the Levi. The officers and one sergeant were taken with the partisans as prisoners. Word quickly spread to Federal leaders like the fires had spread on the Levi, and Union cavalry was soon rushing in pursuit of the bold Southerners. One hundred cavalry and two mountain howitzers, under Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, a future President of the United States, raced down-river on a second steamer and chased the fast-moving Confederates. In spite of the best efforts of Hayes and other cavalry leaders the partisans stayed well ahead of them. The 16^th quickly sent General Scammon on to Dublin, Virginia and the headquarters of West Virginia Department Commander, Major General Samuel Jones. Within a couple of weeks much of the 16^th Virginia was surprised and captured, but the humiliation to Scammon and the losses with the Levi cost the Federal government much more than capturing a small partisan unit profited them. The howitzers were unable to play much of a part in the pursuit or later capture of the 16^th, because the partisans had learned early on not to face Federal artillery when they had none of their own, if they could help it.⁽³⁷⁾

Howitzers, both mountain and naval varieties, were used by the U. S. Navy in fighting the small, Southern torpedo boats that infested the numerous rivers and small coves all around Richmond. In early April the Yankees made a concerted effort to drive off or destroy these pests. On April 9^th the C.S.S. Squib exploded a torpedo against the side of the U.S.S. Minnesota, severely damaging her. Admiral S. P. Lee, onboard the Minnesota during the attack, decided to try and eradicate the threat of the small, torpedo boats. Small launches were equipped with howitzers and sent up various rivers to hunt them down. The searchers were ambushed on April 14^th along Pagan Creek, near where the Squib was hiding. A heavy amount of rifle fire was directed at the Yankee patrol boat. The howitzer was fired twice at the attackers, but after the Union lost Master Charles Wilder to the accurate Southern fire they decided to retreat. The affair was not a Union success, but it did show that howitzers were light enough to provide much needed artillery support for units trying to drive off the tiny, Confederate navy.⁽³⁸⁾

Early on May 9^th Howell's Brigade of the 1^st Division, X Corps was sent to take Chester Station on the Petersburg-Richmond Railroad. The section of track fell to other units, but Howell's men joined in the destruction of the station and the railroad tracks around it. By the evening of the 9^th the brigade had moved towards the Port Walthall road junction to support other Yankee soldiers fighting at the nearby Swift Creek. Early on May 10^th the men began tearing up the track from the Walthall Junction northward. A nearby force was attacked by a large Southern force so Howell's men stopped the destruction and quickly headed to their assistance. On their arrival they found the Federal force being flanked and forced back by the Rebels. Howell found the 1^st New York Mounted Rifles and two mountain howitzers behind the lines and he raced these up to assist the force in holding the Rebels at bay. The horsemen and their two guns were placed on the extreme Union right and helped to stop the flank attack there. The Confederates were massed to hit this exposed flank, but the rapid fire of the 1^st's howitzers and another battery tore their advance to pieces. Late in the day the Federals and the Southerners pulled away from each other. The Yankees dug in and as reinforcements poured in the battle ended and the Yankees were able to finish destroying large stretches of the vital railroad.⁽³⁹⁾

Benjamin Butler kept pushing his army to the northwest towards Richmond. On May 9^th the cavalry protected the Union right in the morning and the left in the afternoon. The 1^st New York Mounted Rifles and its two howitzers were among this group, and skirmished often with any of the numerous, nearby Confederates. Much of the cavalry was sent to destroy bridges so that reinforcements could not reach the Southerners south of the capital. On the 14^th the 3^rd New York and 11^th Pennsylvania Cavalries, and the 3^rd's mountain howitzer, were sent to the Flat Creek Bridge to make a demonstration of trying to cross the bridge. The horsemen were easily repulsed in three separate assaults by the defenders, Company B of the 17^th Virginia Infantry. In spite of having the only artillery piece in the battle the Yankees suffered many more casualties. The 3^rd New York suffered 25 casualties, while the defending Virginians had only three dead and a few wounded. A mountain howitzer was just too small to punch through any fortifications, especially if it was used by half-trained cavalrymen who were not very accurate against a foe who was dug in. After a lot of hard campaigning, including a couple of relatively successful raids, the cavalry spent the rest of the Bermuda Hundred Campaign defending the flanks of Butler's infantry lines.⁽⁴⁰⁾

On June 9^th four mountain howitzers were used by the 5^th and 11^th Pennsylvania Cavalries at Petersburg, Virginia. They had left camp on the 8^th to attack and hopefully seize Petersburg, and draw away men from Lee's army, weakening him as he faced the powerful Army of the Potomac. As they headed for the important Petersburg Plank Road the cavalry was fired on by Confederate pickets on the Jordan's Point Road early on June 9^th. The Yankees dismounted and moved to attack when the Southerners opened on them with artillery, but in spite of this they quickly and easily drove the Confederates away. By 10:30 a.m. the horsemen had reached the plank road and were only five miles from Petersburg. One squadron of the 11^th Cavalry made a mounted charge on the thinly held works, but were driven back with great ease. The rest of the horsemen dismounted and advanced on foot, with two of the howitzers firing in support from the advancing lines. The Yankees faced a storm of bullets and canister balls, but they captured the forward redoubts and rifle pits, killing 30, capturing 40 men and one cannon, and wounding a large number of the Rebels. The Yankees were now within a mile of Petersburg, but the horsemen were tired and short on ammunition, so they waited for reinforcements to come up.

Once the infantry arrived the advance continued. When they got to within 150 yards of the town the Southerners opened an intense fire of bullets and cannon balls on the Federals. The horsemen and their howitzers were unable to advance any farther so they pulled back 50 yards to a nearby abandoned Confederate trench for shelter. The Federal column soon pulled back two miles. They had fought and bled, and then gave up their gains without a fight. The howitzers had done well, such as rolling forward by hand in the front lines, but they were too-short of range to be able to stand up to other guns, such as the field howitzers the Southerners were using. These outranged the small guns by 500 yards, and devastated the horsemen without the mountain howitzers being able to do anything to help their fellow soldiers. This somewhat successful advance was as close as the Yankees would get to the town until it fell the next April, and the war drug on for ten long and bloody months.⁽⁴¹⁾

In mid-1864 as part of U. S. Grant's three-pronged attack on the South he sent Major General David Hunter, a native Virginia, to seize the Shenandoah Valley and end its usefulness as a breadbasket to the Army of Northern Virginia. He burned large stretches of the vital farmlands and many of the towns. The scattered regular and militia units attempted to stop him, but they were too few to do more than just slow him down. A large amount of stores had been given to the care of the cadets at the Virginia Military Institute, including a couple of mountain howitzers. In early June Hunter led his Federal army on Lexington. General John McCausland was quickly and easily pushed back towards the town. On June 11^th the Yankees had crossed the North River, and VMI Superintendent Francis Smith decided to evacuate the town and save the public stores that were in his care. Hunter burned the Institute's buildings in retribution for Virginia's secession. The cadets held a pass at Balcony Falls to allow the wagon and refugees to escape, but they did not have to fight the Yankees who stopped to burn the farms around Lexington. The cadets had successfully evacuated a large amount of stores, including four brass smoothbores, two 3-inch rifles, a couple of mountain howitzers, and large amounts of rifle and artillery ammunition. The cadets turned over the howitzers, their old rifles and the ammunition to Confederate authorities, who quickly lost them on a canal they were trying to float them down when the ship overturned. The mountain howitzers would have been seriously out-ranged by the modern guns that equipped Union batteries, but they were lost without a chance to show if they could have been helped to slow the Federal invasion.⁽⁴²⁾

In mid-June James Wilson's Cavalry Division was sent out by U. S. Grant to ride around Robert E. Lee's army in Richmond and Petersburg. They were to burn any supply depots that they might come across, and sever all of the railroads so that Lee's soldiers would have to deplete the stores on hand in the Confederate capital. Lee's cavalry and infantry reacted with remarkable speed, harassing the Yankee horsemen the whole way and causing them to do only a fraction of the destruction that they might have otherwise done. Wilson fought a number of large skirmishes with Lee's soldiers and used all of his artillery on a number of occasions to stave off his pursuers. By June 29^th Lee's men had surrounded Wilson and his horsemen at Ream's Station, Virginia. Wilson ordered his men to cut their way out and return to Union lines any way that they could. In this disastrous raid the Union army lost 900 men killed, wounded or missing, and 30 wagons or ambulances and 12 artillery pieces were captured, including four mountain howitzers. Cavalry was never intended to stand up to infantry on its own, and while the howitzers were good at decimating any assaults they were not designed to stand up to bigger guns on their own. Other Union forces were supposed to have kept Wade Hampton's cavalry and Lee's infantry busy so that Wilson's men could raid with only a few, weak militia units to try and stop them. Wilson, Grant, Sheridan and Meade seriously overestimated the amount of surprise they would have, and did not give the horsemen enough weapons to be able to oppose regular infantry regiments and artillery batteries.⁽⁴³⁾

In July two mountain howitzers were still in place in the Union defenses around Washington, DC. Two forts were placed on the Virginia side of the bridge early in the war. The two howitzers were located on the District of Columbia side and loaded with double canister to sweep the bridge of any attackers. The commander of the defenses also intended to take the planks up off the bridge if any attacks came. Luckily for the Union government, in spite of a number of scares late in the war, no serious attacks came and the defenses on the Chain Bridge were never tested.⁽⁴⁴⁾

In mid-1864, in an effort to force Grant to detach some of his huge army, Robert E. Lee sent Jubal Early and the 2^nd Corps into the Shenandoah Valley. They chased General David Hunter and his forces into West Virginia without much of a fight. After clearing the Valley the 2^nd Corps advanced into Maryland. The Federal government was in quite a panic and sent a force from Washington to hold up Early long enough for reinforcements to arrive and save the capital. Lew Wallace, future territorial governor of New Mexico and author of Ben Hur, led a mixed force of depleted veteran regiments and untested garrison units to oppose the hard-as-nails Southern "foot cavalry." The two forces slammed into each other along the Monocacy River on July 9^th. The Yankees held for a while, inflicting a large number of casualties on the attacking Rebels, but a flank force under John B. Gordon broke their flank late in the day. A Union mountain howitzer was involved in the fighting. Its rapid fire had helped the Yankees to hold the Monocacy bridge for most of the day, the only one on the route to Washington. It had done its job incredibly well, and was safely removed from the field. Wallace's men were chased off, but they held for most of a day and allowed a tough, veteran corps to arrive from Grant's army at Richmond.⁽⁴⁵⁾

In May 1863 the "Gray Ghost" John S. Mosby first requested a mountain howitzer, and said that he "could use it with great effect, especially on the railroad trains." He would soon get his chance to see how useful the guns could be.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Mosby had 300 men and two mountain howitzers in the "Great Berryville Raid" on August 13^th. He found Phil Sheridan's wagon train lightly guarded by only 700-800 men. Mosby opened fire with one of the howitzers, one breaking down before it could be brought to the fight, and at the same time his men attacked the train, easily routing the guards. The remaining howitzer fired a few rounds, but the carriage broke, rendering it useless. This was a common occurrence with the weak pack carriage. He captured 200 prisoners, killed or wounded a number of others, and destroyed 75 loaded wagons. He took away 200 beef cattle, 500-600 horses and a large amount of badly needed supplies. The Union army sent many men in pursuit of the bold raiders, but they never even came close to catching them. Mosby carried off the barrels and broke carriages of the two howitzers, and continued to favor the howitzer for his style of fighting and used several during the rest of the war.⁽⁴⁷⁾

The Confederates had a major food, salt, and leather manufacturing center at Saltville, in the southwestern part of Virginia. Several Union raids tried to seize or destroy the center, but they could never concentrate enough men to take the town. On October 2^nd six mountain howitzers accompanied 4,200 cavalry and mounted infantry, one of the largest forces sent to destroy Saltville. The Federals shelled the town all day and assaulted it several times, but they were unable to make any headway in the Confederate works. The Federals withdrew at 5:00 p.m. after suffering a considerable number of casualties. The howitzers might have kept up well, but the powder charges they used to propel the rounds were not strong enough to punch through the thick dirt and wood fortifications that the Confederates had spent three years working on.⁽⁴⁸⁾

On November 29^th the Federal forces in the Carolinas assembled 5,500 infantry and naval troops in three brigades, and three batteries of artillery for a raid against the food supplies and railroads in the area of Grahamville in southeastern South Carolina. Grahamville was a large depot and vital rail center just north of Savannah, Georgia. The naval brigade was the first to land and Brigadier General John Hatch sent it on ahead to occupy a crossroads two miles from the landing area. Eight light naval howitzers accompanied the sailors, drawn along by hand. They attacked and easily drove away a small Confederate force. By late on the day more troops had landed and Hatch decided to push hard for Grahamville. The naval and infantry soldiers marched all through the evening, but a lack of guides kept them from ever finding the right road to get to the town. Early on November 30^th two mountain howitzers were detached from the rest of Hatch's force with four companies of the famous 54^th Massachusetts Infantry to hold the oft-used crossroads. Soon, Confederates from the northeast tried to seize these crossroads and cut off Hatch's force, but they were quickly repulsed by the very accurate fire of the howitzers and the 54^th. The crossroads and the rest of Hatch's force were saved by this small detachment.

The rest of the force continued on towards Grahamville, driving the Southern defenders for several miles. At Honey Hill the Confederates fell into pre-made defenses and repulsed a few Union assaults. The Union soldiers tried and failed to take the works, but they also repulsed several Rebel assaults on themselves. Artillery caissons continually raced back to the landing point to bring up new supplies of artillery and rifle ammunition, and without the soldiers holding the vital crossroads Hatch's men would have quickly been without ammunition to fight off the Southern assaults. Hatch was finally forced to call off the raid and return to the landing in the evening of the 30^th. The raid did not accomplish many of its goals, but the mountain howitzers had proven their worth by saving the crossroads and with it Hatch's army.⁽⁴⁹⁾

There are no known uses of howitzers in the last year of the war. The war had mostly devolved into sieges of Petersburg and Richmond or small hit-and-run raids by partisan units, such as John Singleton Mosby. Larger guns had almost completely replaced the mountain howitzer and it was shunted off on less well-supplied theaters, such as the arena west of the Mississippi River.

1. Brigadier General Ebenezer W. Pierce to Major General Benjamin F. Butler, 12 June 1861, OR, ser. I, vol. 2, (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1880) pp. 84-87.

2. Herman Hattaway, General Stephen D. Lee (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1976), pp. 29-33.

3. Report of Brigadier General Henry W. Benham, 12 September 1861, OR, ser. I, vol. 5,(Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1882), pp. 134-36.

4. Randolph A. Shotwell, "The Yankees Suffer Disaster at Ball's Bluff," The Blue and the Gray, vol. 1, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 115-19. Shotwell gives an overview to the whole campaign and the panic at the end. Also see, Report of Brigadier General Charles Stone, 29 October 1861, OR, ser. I, vol. 5, pp. 294-300. Report of Colonel Milton Cogswell, 22 September 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 5, pp. 321-24. These two reports discuss the battle from the Union viewpoint. Also the Report of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Griffith, 25 October 1861, OR, ser. I, vol. 5, pp. 366-67. Griffith details the battle from the Confederates point of view.

5. Henry B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia (Secaucus, NJ: The Blue and Grey Press, 1993), p. 49.

6. Brigadier General James. E. B. Stuart to Major Thomas G. Rhett, 13 May 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 11, pt. 1, (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1884), p. 445.

7. General J. E. B. Stuart to Major Thomas G. Rhett, 13 May 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 11, pt. 1, p. 445-46. Stuart describes the driving off of the advancing Yankee soldiers. Also, James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1903), p. 74. Longstreet talks about Stuart's Horse Artillery being deployed in the open field to combat the Union soldiers.

8. Captain John Pelham to Brigadier General J. E. B. Stuart, OR, ser. I, vol. 11, pt. 1, pp. 575-76.

9. Brigadier General Henry Heth to General Samuel Cooper, 16 May 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 15 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1886), pp. 492-94.

10. General Henry Heth to Major General William W. Loring, 23 May 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 15, pp. 813-14.

11. Jennings Cropper Wise, The Long Arm of Lee: Vol. 1-Bull Run to Fredericksburg (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), pp. 174-75. Wise discusses the mules causing the battery to see no combat.

12. Robert G. Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring 1862 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996), pp. 394-95. He discusses Jackson's reasons for wanting the howitzers and giving up on using them.

13. Richard Wormser, The Yellowlegs: The Story of the United States Cavalry (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 165-67.

14. Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, A Study in Command, Vol. 1: Manassas to Malvern Hill (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), pp. 192 & 278-80 & 640-41.

15. Colonel William R. Lloyd to Major General Adolf Steinwehr, 22 July 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 16 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1886), pp. 98-99.

16. Colonel John Beardsley to Major General Franz Sigel, 13 September 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, pp. 271-73.

17. Edward McCrady, "Gregg's Brigade in the Second Battle of Manassas," The Blue and the Gray: The Story of the Civil War as Told by Participants. Ed. by Henry S. Commager. (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 180-83.

18. Heinrich Dietz, "Guns of Interest," The Artilleryman, Spring, 1997, pp.10-12. Also, Lieutenant William H. Chesebrough to Major General Franz Sigel, 17 September 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, pp. 280-82. And Report of Brigadier General Carl Schurz, OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, pp. 300-04.

19. Lieutenant Colonel Theodore B. Gates to Captain J. P. Kimball, 4 September 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 16, pp. 377-78.

20. Colonel J. A. J. Lightburn to Major General Horatio G. Wright, 24 September 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 19, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1887), pp. 1,059-61. Also, Colonel E. Siber to Lieutenant B. D. Boswell, 23 September 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 19, pt. 1, pp. 1,061-64. And Colonel Samuel A. Gilbert to Lieutenant B. D. Boswell, 23 September 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 19, pt. 1, pp. 1064-69.

21. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia (Secaucus, NJ: The Blue and Grey Press, 1993), p. 120-22.

22. Walter H. Taylor, General Lee: His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-1865, With Personal Reminiscences (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), pp. 128-29. Also, E. Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 272-73. Taylor dealt with the official reports and returns of the engagement as one of Lee's aides and Alexander was the ordinance officer in charge of removing the captured rifles, cannons and stores.

23. Colonel John B. Cumming to Assistant Adjutant General John R. Mott, 23 September 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 51, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1897), p. 168.

24. Colonel Andrew T. McReynolds to Brigadier General R. B. Marcy, 5 October 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 19, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1887), p. 18.

25. Major General Jacob D. Cox to Major N. H. McLean, 1 November 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 19, pt. 2, pp. 530-32.

26. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, p. 174-78.

27. Colonel Thomas J. C. Amory to Major Southard Hoffman, 12 November 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 18, pp. 25-26.

28. Major Charles F. Simmons to Lieutenant Colonel John Mix, 15 December 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 18, pp. 68-69.

29. Major General John Peck to Colonel D. T. Van Buren, 4 February 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 18, pp. 133-36.

30. Brigadier General Thomas H. Neill to Major Charles Mundee, 7 May 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 25, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1889), pp.611-12. Also, William K. Goolrick, The Civil War; Rebels Resurgent: Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville, (Alexandria, VA: Time Life Books, 1985), pp.151-61.

31. Jane A. Martin, ed., The Civil War; Spies, Scouts and Raiders: Irregular Operations (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985), pp. 119-22.

32. Heinrich Dietz, "Guns of Interest," The Artilleryman, Spring, 1997, p. 12.

33. Brigadier General Julius White to Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Richmond, 11 July 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 23, pt. 1, pp. 820-21. Also, Jeffrey C. Weaver, 7^th Battalion Confederate Cavalry Web Site. Available: http://members.aol.com/jweaver301/nc/7csahis.htm. 2 July 1997.

34. Extract from the Journal Of Operations in Charleston Harbor, 7 November 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 28, pt. 1, (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1890), pp. 158-59.

35. David A. Norris, "The gallant but ill-fated 12^th New York Cavalry paid a steep price for its fidelity to the Union," America's Civil War, January, 1997. Found at Southern New York Web Site. Available: http://snycorva.cortalnd.edu/~woosterk/Norris.html. 11 February 1998.

36. Brigadier Innis N. Palmer to Major R. S. Davis, 20 February 1864, OR, ser. I, vol. 33 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1891), pp. 58-60.

37. Robert C. Cheeks, "The 16^th Virginia 'Border Rangers' used all their backwoods guile to capture a Union Steamer without firing a shot," America's Civil War, January, 1998, pp. 18-24.

38. Milton F. Perry, Infernal Machines: The Story of Confederate Submarine and Mine Warfare (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), pp. 126-29.

39. Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry to Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Smith, 11 May 1864, OR, ser. I, vol. 51, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1897), pp. 1232-35.

40. Herbert M. Schiller, The Bermuda Hundred Campaign: Operations on the South Side of the James River, Virginia -- May, 1864 (Dayton, OH: Morningside House, Inc., 1988), pp. 152-55, 172 and 210-12.

41. Colonel Samuel P. Spear to Captain M. J. Asch, 11 June 1864, OR, ser. I, vol. 36, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1891), pp. 311-13.

42. VMI Superintendent Francis H. Smith to Major General William H. Richardson, 17 June 1864. Found at the official Virginia Military Institute Web Site. Available at: http://www.vmi.edu/~archtml/cwhr_ltr.html. 18 January 1997.

43. Peter S. Carmichael, Lee's Young Artillerist: William R. J. Pegram (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1995), 124-26. Also, Major General James H. Wilson to Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Forsyth, 18 February 1865, OR, ser. I, vol. 40, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1892), pp. 621-26.

44. Lieutenant Colonel B. S. Alexander to Major General Henry W. Halleck, 6 July 1864, OR, ser. I, vol. 37, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1891), pp. 84-85.

45. Captain Frederick W. Alexander to Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Lawrence, 13 July 1864, OR, ser. I, vol. 37, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1891), pp. 223-24.

46. Major John S. Mosby to Major General J. E. B. Stuart, 19 May 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 25, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1889), pp. 862-63.

47. Virgil C. Jones, Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders (New York: Holt Publishing, 1956), pp. 100-01. Also, Lieutenant Colonel John S. Mosby to Lieutenant Colonel Walter Taylor, OR, ser. I, vol. 43, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1893), pp. 634-36.

48. Brigadier General Nathaniel McLean's Itinerary of the 1^st Division, undated, OR, ser. I, vol. 39, pt. 1(Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1892), pp. 555-56.

49. Brigadier General John P. Hatch to Captain W. L. M. Burger, December 1864, OR, ser. I, vol. 44 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1893), pp. 422-26.