The western theater suffered a much more acute shortage of modern artillery pieces than the eastern theater in the early stages of the war. According to Union intelligence reports Confederate General Gideon Pillow had a number of mountain howitzers as part of his defenses around the vital point of New Madrid, Tennessee.⁽¹⁾ Two mountain howitzers and a rifled gun of Watson's Louisiana Battery accompanied the 1^st Louisiana Cavalry to Bowling Green, Kentucky in November 1861. The guns would later be attached as part of the 1^st Louisiana and would see fighting throughout Tennessee, Kentucky and Georgia with the regiment.⁽²⁾ At Johnson's Island in Ohio a prison was begun in late 1861 to house captured Confederates. Its guards were the Hoffman Battalion of Ohio Volunteer Infantry. At the main gate two blockhouses were built and each was equipped with a mountain howitzer to stop any escape attempts by the prisoners.⁽³⁾

The only known action seen by mountain howitzers in this theater in the first year of the war came at Belmont, Missouri on November 7^th. Watson's Louisiana Battery was part of the Southern force sent across the Mississippi River to try and secure the river for the South. Brigadier General U. S. Grant decided to drive off this garrison and attacked it. The guns only had a small supply of ammunition and by the early afternoon they had exhausted their supply. At 2:00 p.m. a Union assault shattered the Confederate line. Forty-five of the battery's horses were killed and the guns were overrun. Southern reinforcements poured in from Tennessee, and Grant's men were forced back later in the day and four of Watson's guns were recovered, including the two mountain howitzers. The howitzers were soon detached and assigned to the 1^st Louisiana Cavalry with whom they would fight for much of the rest of the war.⁽⁴⁾

The mountain howitzers of the 1^st Louisiana Cavalry skirmished with Union cavalry near Athens, Alabama on May 1^st. Both sides were roughly the same size. According to Colonel James S. Scott, of the 1^st Louisiana Cavalry, his Confederate cavalry brigade went ahead and attacked the Yankees first. The rapid cavalry attack and the fire of the 1^st Louisiana's battery of mountain howitzers quickly, and easily, routed the Yankees. They captured 150 stands of arms, ammunition, commissary stores, and all of their tents and camp equipage. He reported the Union loss at 200 killed and wounded. While undoubtedly their casualties were more than likely not as high as he claimed it was still more than the Confederate loss of one killed and three wounded.⁽⁵⁾

The 2^nd Kentucky (C.S.) Cavalry Regiment, under John Hunt Morgan, used them on July 11^th at Lebanon, Kentucky during Morgan's First Kentucky Raid. They came upon a bridge over the Rolling Fork River, six miles from Lebanon. This bridge was guarded by a blockhouse and a large number of soldiers. There were too many Yankees for Morgan's men to assault the bridge, so Morgan called up the regiment's two mountain howitzers. The cavalrymen had developed a fondness for these guns, which they called "bull pups" after their bark-like reports. Basil Duke preferred these guns to the 3-inch Ordinance Rifles that would be assigned to Morgan for later raids. He said:

They can go over ravines, up hills, through thickets, almost anywhere, in short that a horseman can go; they can be taken, without attracting attention, in as close proximity to the enemy as two horsemen can go-they throw shell with accuracy eight hundred yards, quite as far as there is any necessity for, generally in cavalry fighting-they throw canister and grape, two and three hundred yards, as effectively as a twelve-pounder-they can be carried by hand right along with the line, and as close to the enemy as the line goes-and they make a great deal more noise than one would suppose from their size and appearance.⁽⁶⁾

One shot from a howitzer was enough to send the bridge guards running back to Lebanon. They soon captured the town, 200 Union soldiers, and destroyed large numbers of guns and tons of stores and ammunition. The raid continued with inept and ineffective resistance by the Union garrisons throughout the region. Within a couple of weeks they were safely back in Confederate lines with an impressive raid to their credit and having instilled a lot of fear in the Union garrisons of Kentucky.⁽⁷⁾

The 6^th Missouri (U. S.) Cavalry used howitzers on July 25^th at Hudson's Bridge near Austin, Mississippi, in the northwestern part of the state. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Wood led 100 men and the two howitzers of the 6^th, and 90 men of the 8^th Indiana Infantry from Helena, Arkansas on a raid to destroy supplies and chase off local partisan units. Along the way they burned the camp of the "Missouri Swamp Fox" They pushed on to destroy the depot at Austin, Mississippi that supplied General Thomas Hindman. First they would have to take Hudson's Bridge before they could attack Austin, but there was a Confederate force guarding the bridge. Wood brought up the howitzers, and after three or four rounds the Rebels fled and the bridge was in Union hands. At a second bridge the howitzers fired only one round before the Rebels fled once again. However, this time they had taken the planks off the bridge so that the Yankees could not cross it. So they were forced to retreat back to Helena. Overall the raid was a failure. They were unable to catch M. Jeff Thompson or to destroy Hindman's ammunition train. Also, they were unable to inflict any large numbers of casualties or to break up any Confederate units. But, they did tie up many units in chasing them and in guarding against a repeat of the raid, so some good came from Wood's raid into Mississippi.⁽⁸⁾

In mid-1862 Braxton Bragg led the Army of Tennessee into Union-held Kentucky to relieve Union pressure on other Southern states and to hopefully gain new recruits for his force. Confederate forces had begun to surround a Union garrison at Richmond, Kentucky and planned to lay siege to it. Before large numbers of Confederate infantry could move up, the Union soldiers sortied from the town and attacked the 1^st Louisiana Cavalry, routing them and seizing one of their mountain howitzers. The cavalry fell back on Patrick Cleburne's division. The pursuing Union cavalrymen ran smack into Cleburne's division. The infantry opened fire on the Union horsemen and routed them as they had done to the Louisianans. The Southerners captured 30 men, 100 rifles and some horses.⁽⁹⁾ The next day the battle continued around the town. Cleburne moved forward with his entire division. He found the enemy drawn up in line of battle a half mile of the town. Cleburne deployed three batteries to fire on the Yankees, and all they replied with was the one howitzer they had captured the day before. According to Cleburne the fire of the small gun was "pathetic." The battle continued to be only artillery and skirmishers for a few hours, but finally the Yankees advanced on Cleburne's right flank. Cleburne stopped their flanking movement and was able to break through the Union center. Soon the Union force was fleeing from the field in a panic. The town, and a large amount of supplies and weapons, easily fell to the Confederates and opened up a route for supplies to Bragg's army from farther south.⁽¹⁰⁾

As Bragg's army continued north they attacked many strategic, Union-held towns. One Union infantry brigade was besieged from September 14-17 at Munfordville, Kentucky. The siege began when Scott's Confederate cavalry brigade surrounded the town on September 13^th and before dawn on September 14^th he attacked. It took the mountain howitzers to drive in the Union pickets. Confederate infantry soon joined Scott's attack on Munfordville. The battle see-sawed back and forth all day with neither side giving or gaining much ground. On the 15^th just after dawn the Confederates renewed their assault. When they got to within 30 yards of the Union line the Yankees opened fire, killing and wounding many and causing the rest of the Rebels to retreat. A few weaker assaults followed, but by 9:30 a.m. the Confederates settled down to a regular siege of the town. Around this time Confederate Brigadier General James R. Chalmers sent in a demand of surrender which was promptly rejected by the Union commander, Colonel John Wilder. Reinforcements continued to arrive for the Union defenders, so no more assaults occurred.

Instead on the 17^th, as the Confederate forces continued to arrive around the town, including the corps of Leonidas Polk and William Hardee, the Union garrison was forced to surrender to overwhelming odds. The Southerners received several thousand rifles, four cannons of the 13^th Indiana Battery, and a large amount of stores and ammunition. The howitzers did not play much of a role after Scott's initial assaults on the 14^th. They were outranged by all four of the Union guns and they were quickly relieved by longer-range Confederate guns, which were arriving with their infantry units. They tried to set up the two howitzers on a hill to stop any reinforcements from reaching the garrison, but Scott had too few men to defend them from determined Yankee infantry. So he was forced to withdraw and wait for larger Confederate infantry and artillery units to come up and close off the route of reinforcements. While the Confederates won the battle they suffered 35 killed and 250 wounded, but the Yankees lost only 37 killed and wounded.⁽¹¹⁾

At Augusta, Kentucky on September 27^th Morgan's 2^nd Kentucky Cavalry skirmished with Union forces as part of his Second Kentucky Raid in support of Bragg's invasion of Kentucky. The howitzers had only recently rejoined the command after having to be sent to Knoxville for repairs. The "Bull Pups" were more than ready to keep up with Morgan's fast-riding raiders. As they approached Augusta they discovered Union militia waiting for them. Company A, 2^nd Kentucky, and the howitzers opened fire on two river-transports, while the rest of Morgan's men attacked the town. The howitzers opened fire on the boats, one shell even penetrated the hull of the U.S.S. Belfast. The Union boats fired only three rounds each before they fled upriver. The militiamen were holding the rest of the Confederates at bay by firing from many of the buildings in the town. Things went from bad to worse for the Southerners, when the howitzers mistook some of them for Yankees and opened fire, wounding several men. Many of the militia tried to surrender, but when the Confederates tried to take their surrender other militiamen shot at them. The Rebels saw this as a deliberate attempt and brought the "Bull Pups" forward to blast all of the militiamen out of their hiding places. The howitzers were brought into town and their double-canister rounds blasted gaping holes in the doors and walls of the houses. Quickly all of the militiamen surrendered. Their resistance ended John Hunt Morgan's plan of crossing into Ohio to distract Union units from being able to oppose Braxton Bragg in Kentucky. All of the howitzers ammunition had been expended, and many of his men were killed, wounded and exhausted. Morgan had to rejoin Bragg's main force, and retreat when Bragg returned to the Deep South.⁽¹²⁾

To relieve some of the pressure on Bragg's forces John Morgan staged a small raid in October. They encountered only slight resistance until they fought at Lexington, Kentucky on October 16^th. Two companies of the 4^th Ohio Cavalry held the town, while the rest of the regiment was encamped two miles outside of the town. At dawn Morgan's men attacked the town and the camp. The howitzers accompanied the force attacking the camp. The battle did not go well, with one howitzer mistakenly lobbing a shell into the middle of one of Morgan's companies, but without injuring anyone. Quickly the men in the camp fled or surrendered, and the town's garrison soon followed suit. The battle ended so quickly that the howitzers had little impact on the outcome of the fight.⁽¹³⁾

When John Hunt Morgan expanded his command to a full brigade he added two rifled Ellsworth guns to his mountain howitzers and formed Cobb's Kentucky Battery. On December 6^th Morgan led 1,400 men of two Kentucky infantry regiments and his own brigade. The object of the raid was to attack a Federal garrison at Hartsville, Tennessee on December 7^th. They quietly surrounded the town in the early morning of the 7^th. The howitzers were placed on the far side of the town to help keep the Yankees from escaping to the north. Two miles from Hartsville the dismounted Rebels attacked the Union pickets and drove them easily towards the town. The infantry joined in the attack and drove in the Union left wing. Resistance increased as they got closer to the town. The artillery fired from two sides of the town and after an hour and a half of fighting the garrison surrendered. Morgan had taken 1,800 prisoners, 1,800 stand of arms, two rifled cannons, and a large amount of ammunition and stores. Quickly he loaded up the captured goods and weapons and retreated back over the Cumberland River. It was a minor skirmish, but it increased the fear of Morgan. There was a resulting increase in the number of Yankees tied up at important supply depots to hold them against imagined raids by Morgan's hard riding horsemen.⁽¹⁴⁾

Morgan's 2^nd Kentucky Cavalry next used a mountain howitzer at Elizabethtown, Kentucky on December 27^th, as a part of his famous Christmas Raid. Morgan's cavalry surrounded the town and were surprised to receive a demand for the surrender of Morgan's force from the town. Morgan laughingly rejected their demand and responded with a surrender demand of his own. Both sides refused to surrender to the other and Morgan decided to attack. The Confederates easily got to the buildings at the edge of town, but the 800 Yankees pulled back into some brick buildings and warehouses facing to the south. The battery of two howitzers and two Parrots attached to Morgan's brigade opened fire on the Yankee defenders. Very quickly the fire of these cannons forced the garrison to surrender. The next day Morgan's artillery shelled a Union garrison at two wooden bridges, which had been the whole objective of the Christmas Raid. The shelling continued for two to three hours, and just as the Confederates moved forward to assault the defenses both bridges garrisons surrendered. Morgan then returned to the Confederate lines at a leisurely pace with all of his captured weapons, ammunition and assorted stores. Once again the howitzers saved many lives in Morgan's command by shelling Union soldiers out of their defensive works.⁽¹⁵⁾

John Morton's Tennessee Battery, attached to Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry division, used mountain howitzers at Parker's Crossroads in Tennessee on December 31^st. The battery had been formed on December 27^th by consolidating two rifled cannons under Captain John Morton and two mountain howitzers under Lieutenant A. W. Gould, previously attached to Napier's Tennessee Cavalry Battalion. Forrest began a raid behind Union lines shortly after the formation of Morton's Battery. He learned that a Union brigade was rushing to join another one at Parker's Crossroads to prevent him from crossing the a river to get behind the Union front-lines. Forrest believed that artillery was most effective when fought at close ranges, such as rifle-range of about 300 yards. The howitzer was perfect for this type of fast moving and close in fighting that Forrest preferred. The artillery dueled for a while and Forrest held back his cavalry in case the second Union brigade arrived in time to oppose him. Finally the artillery opened a hole in the Union lines and allowed Forrest's men to break through to the town. Union reports state that every time they would try to reform Morton's guns would approach to within fifty feet of them and the Yankees would break and run before the cannons could fire. Just as the first brigade was about to surrender the second arrived and attacked Forrest's rear. The cavalry had a running fight to escape, and Forrest had to fight several rear-guard actions just to save his precious cannons. The battle may have been a loss, but the howitzers proved they could be devastating when used in the close-in fighting that Nathan Bedford Forrest loved.⁽¹⁶⁾

John Morton's Battery's of mountain howitzers joined Nathan Bedford Forrest on a raid to Dover, Tennessee and the nearby Cumberland Iron Works in mid-January. Forrest attacked the iron works on January 28^th. There were two Union infantry companies at the works, but they were quickly and easily captured without any resistance. General Joe Wheeler was supposed to attack Dover from one side while Forrest attacked from the other. Forrest got into position and waited for Wheeler to come up and attack. Morton's Battery exchanged fire with a single Federal gun, which they quickly hit and dismounted. Before Wheeler could arrive Forrest saw a large body of Union cavalry riding away from the town, probably trying to escape, and he decided to attack them. Forrest's men chased the cavalry back to their fortifications and attempted to attack the entrenched Yankees. They reached the Union trenches, but Forrest's men were cut to pieces by the fort's large siege guns firing huge rounds of double canister. Forrest was wounded in the fight, but the Confederates did not pull back until late in the day. The Union forces made no attempt to sortie from their fort and attack the heavily cut-up Rebels. So the Southerners were able to recover their dead and wounded, and to haul off all of the supplies captured at the iron works and in parts of the town. Morton's battery fought all day long, but they had to stay in hiding whenever the siege guns tried to fire on them. Howitzers would lose any contest against the larger smoothbore and rifled field pieces, and they stood absolutely no chance against huge siege guns. Forrest felt that he had been abandoned by Wheeler, who was a day late. At a meeting on the retreat Forrest hotly informed Wheeler that he would never serve under him again.⁽¹⁷⁾

Wilder's Mounted Infantry Brigade, one of the toughest units in the Union's Western forces, had howitzers added to the armament of its 18^th Indiana Battery beginning in early February. Colonel Wilder had seen the benefits of mountain howitzers when he was besieged several months earlier at Munfordville, Kentucky. The howitzers could load and fire much more rapidly than rifled guns, and they were often used to stop Confederate infantry forces that would try to attack the rifled guns of the battery.

Union artilleryman Albert Underwood recorded in his diary a skirmish on February 14^th at Meridian, Mississippi. A large Union force was sent to attack several different groups Confederate cavalrymen in northern Mississippi, who had been making raids against Union supply points in Tennessee. At Meridian a small force was encountered guarding a Southern depot. A few shells were thrown by the mountain howitzers of an unspecified Union cavalry regiment and the Confederates abandoned the town to them. The Union force burned some more towns and fought small skirmishes with scattered Southern cavalry forces, and then they returned to Tennessee with only a few losses.⁽¹⁸⁾

After many of these Union raids from Tennessee and from ships off the coast many artillery pieces, including a number of mountain howitzers, were added to the defenses around Savannah, Georgia in March. Small forts with artillery were placed along many of the rivers that were deep enough for Union steamships to move up and transport troops to raid all over Georgia. Savannah itself feared that transports could land troops for an overland attack on the city. In the rush to fortify all of the rivers two 12-pound mountain howitzers were placed in the "ricer batteries" defending the smaller rivers. Several were placed in the forts on the river approaches to the port and the islands leading to the Atlantic from Savannah. One was placed on Genesis Point at Fort McAllister. A mountain howitzer was placed in Fort Jackson, and another in Battery Lawton on an island across the river, facing Fort Jackson. These were there to defend against infantry attacks on the forts, where the larger anti-ship guns could not be effectively used against infantry.⁽¹⁹⁾

Morton's Battery fought at Franklin, Tennessee on March 5^th, as part of one of Forrest's numerous raids into Tennessee. Forrest's men had been repulsed in one assault and the Union garrison advanced to attack them before they could reform. Forrest rushed forward his two batteries, including the two howitzers of Morton's battery, and at point blank range they cut huge swathes through the advancing Federal infantry and drove off a Union battery. The Federals retreated to a ridge behind the railroad track running through the edge of Franklin. Morton found a high position which dominated the new Yankee line. The fire of Morton's guns and the rapid advance of Forrest's men forced the Yankees to surrender. Many others fled north or back into the Union fort across the river.

Forrest once again supplemented the fire of his men with artillery firing at point-blank range, and the artillery broke up every attempt by the Union infantry to make a stand.⁽²⁰⁾ Union forces were chasing John Hunt Morgan's brigade all over Tennessee with little success after yet another of his raids. One cavalry brigade came close to them, but the rear-guard used its mountain howitzers to repulse their pursuers on March 20^th at Milton, Tennessee. A couple of rounds from the guns allowed them to escape and ended any serious pursuit of the brigade.⁽²¹⁾ Just before Morgan's force departed on their disastrous Ohio raid the howitzers were taken from them by Braxton Bragg. This came near to causing a mutiny among the cannoneers and cavalrymen who loved the howitzers with their ability to stay with the fast-riding men and to provide vital artillery support. To add insult to injury the howitzers were captured from Bragg by Union cavalry within a couple of weeks.⁽²²⁾

Confederate forces moved back into eastern Kentucky in mid-March. Major General Quincy Gillmore began massing his scattered garrisons to oppose the Southern army. He was quickly able to assemble 1,250 mounted men, two large cannons and four mountain howitzers to stop the advance. The two armies finally fought on March 30^th at Somerset, Kentucky. 6,000 Federals scattered all over western Virginia, eastern Tennessee and eastern Kentucky retreated before the advancing Confederates. Yankee intelligence indicated that Pegram had 3,500 men and six artillery pieces with him, while two other Southern forces of 1,500 and 750 men roamed in the area around him. Gillmore planned to attack Pegram before he could form a junction with the other two Confederate forces. After daybreak on the 30^th the 1,250 Federals moved forward to attack Pegram's men on Dutton's Hill 3 miles north of Somerset, Kentucky. The artillery, in the center, began the battle thirty minutes after noon. As they shelled the Confederate line a Southern mounted force attacked the Union right flank forcing it back. At the same time Gillmore ordered the right and center to assault the Confederates on the hill. Most of the Confederate fire went high over their heads and the hill fell rather easily. The artillery and the men then turned to assist the embattled Union right flank. After several more hours of fighting Pegram's command retreated to southwestern Virginia. They had suffered around 300 casualties and left behind much of the supplies, livestock and other plunder they had picked up from the abandoned Union outposts.⁽²³⁾

The howitzers of the 18^th Indiana Battery saw their first combat on April 21^st at McMinnville, Tennessee. After repeated skirmishes with Joe Wheeler's Confederate cavalry the Union high command decided to send a force to clean them out of some of the towns they had been staging out of near Union lines. On April 20^th Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, the 18^th Indiana Battery's eight guns, and a cavalry brigade headed to McMinnville to evict John Hunt Morgan's cavalry brigade. Near dusk on the 21^st part of the infantry attacked from the west while the battery and the rest of the Yankees circled and attacked from the east. After only a few rounds from the artillery, including the howitzers, and a cavalry charge, Morgan's cavalry scattered and raced for their lives. Wilder's men then set about destroying the depot with its bridges, 600 blankets, 30,000 pounds of bacon, tons of other foodstuffs, and numerous cotton gins and textile mills. The howitzers had performed superbly in their first battle with the 18^th and would see action on numerous occasions after many other unit's howitzers had been replaced by longer-range pieces.⁽²⁴⁾

Early on June 9^th Colonel August Kautz of the 2^nd Ohio Cavalry led a demi-brigade from Somerset, Kentucky, made up of detachments from his own regiment, the 7^th Ohio Cavalry, the 54^th Ohio Mounted Infantry and four pieces of Private Jesse Law's mountain howitzer battery. They were to make a demonstration towards the Confederates around Monticello, Kentucky. After crossing the Cumberland River, Kautz was joined by 300 more men of the 2^nd Tennessee and 45^th Ohio Mounted Infantries. This new force had skirmished earlier with the local Southern soldiers, and four or five miles past the river Kautz found the Southerners were drawn up in line of battle and ready to fight this large Union force. A section of the howitzers were brought forward, and after a few shells the Confederates withdrew. The Yankees continued pursuing them all the way to Monticello and through the town. The Federals held it for a few hours, and in the late afternoon they began heading back to the Federal base at Somerset, Kentucky. Towards evening the rear-guard came under attack by a regrouped Southern brigade. The first attack was repulsed by only two Federal companies, but the Confederates were massing in the nearby woods to attack again. Soon two Union regiments and a section of howitzers arrived. Their fire cut wide gaps in the Confederate ranks, and the fighting ended as evening came on. The Confederates made no effort to pursue the Union brigade on June 10^th. Colonel Kautz recommended Private Law for a commission and official command of the battery that he led. Kautz complimented Law for the accurate and destructive fire of his mountain howitzer.⁽²⁵⁾

An unnamed Confederate Missouri Cavalry regiment used howitzers again Union positions at Memphis, Tennessee on June 15^th. The Confederate leaders had come up with a plan to harass Union shipping on the Mississippi. Southern forces in Arkansas were chosen to attempt this interdiction, because they could move through unconquered lands while any Confederates in Tennessee would have to cross many miles of Union-occupied land. Two hundred and fifty men were dispatched by Sterling Price with a couple of mountain howitzers. They set up their ambush north of Memphis on the western side of the Mississippi by mid-June. They fired on a few transports, causing only a little damage, but a great amount of consternation among Union leaders in Arkansas and Tennessee. Many Federals were tied up running around on both sides of the river trying to catch the raiders and their artillery, but they easily made their way back to Confederate lines. The raids caused an uproar among Union leaders, but they did not cause a lot of damage and the Yankees quickly returned to their attacks on the main Confederate armies.⁽²⁶⁾

The 18^th Indiana Battery used its howitzers at Hoover's Gap, Tennessee on June 24^th. The Union army was beginning its advance after six months of resting from its rough handling at the Battle of Murfreesboro in December 1862-January 1863. The 18^th Indiana and Wilder's Mounted Brigade were attached to George H. Thomas's XIV Corps, and were ordered to move towards Hoover's Gap to the southwest. Nine miles from Murfreesboro Wilder ran into Confederate skirmishers. The cavalry pickets were easily driven back on the main Southern works five miles closer to the gap. The Federals captured a signal station at the entrance to the Gap so quickly that the equipment was left behind. In the rapidity of the advance many of the horses began to give out and the artillery had to be drug forward by hand. The Yankees followed the Southerners so closely that the Rebels were unable to make a stand in the Gap. Confederate infantry of General William B. Bate's brigade began their march to the Gap at 2:00 p.m. Wilder's men dug in on the southern end of the Gap and rushed the artillery forward. The mountain howitzers were posted on the right side of the main road facing to the southeast.

At 3:00 Bate's infantrymen attacked the entrenched Federals. Two batteries of Southern artillery opened fire at 1,200 yards on the 18^th Indiana Battery and caught the howitzers in a cross-fire which killed two gunners and all the mules of one gun. The 18^th's rifled guns returned fire, dismounting one of the Southern guns and forcing them to change positions several times. The rifled guns continued to fire at the opposing batteries, and the howitzers fired double-canister charges into the advancing Confederate infantry and helped stop the Rebels 50 feet from the Union line. Then the howitzers helped drive off an attempt to seize the 18^th's guns with great slaughter. Several other assaults followed, but the 18^th's guns and the 700 seven-shot Spencers used by some of Wilder's men easily repulsed the Southerners. By 4:00 p.m. two Union infantry brigades had arrived and the Northern hold on Hoover's Gap was assured. Over the course of the battle the battery had fired 350 rounds, much of it double-canister which slaughtered many of the attacking Rebs. During the night Wilder's brigade and the 18^th Indiana Battery were removed from the line to rest and resupply.⁽²⁷⁾

The movement of the various Union corps forced Braxton Bragg to begin a retreat which would end up with the Confederates gone from most of Tennessee. Wilder's brigade and the 18^th Indiana Battery's mountain howitzers saw action again at Tullahoma, Tennessee on June 28^th. Bragg's headquarters and central depot had been located at Tullahoma since January 1863. Wilder was to cut the communication and supply lines, and interfere with the Southern retreat. Because they were to move quick and strike hard the 18^th Indiana took along only two mountain howitzers. The rest of the battery was left behind to come up with the slower moving infantry. They had to detour far to the southeast, since many of the rivers were swollen and fast-moving with the beginnings of the melting of the winter snow in the mountains. Near Pelham, Tennessee they found a place they could finally ford a river, but the howitzers's ammunition had to be carried across on the shoulders of the horsemen. Later, they had to dismantle a saw mill to make rafts to float the howitzers across the Elk River. A few miles down the road, near Decherd, they ran into a Confederate stockade defending the vital railroad. The howitzers fired a number of rounds of canister, and the 80 Southern defenders beat a hasty retreat. The evening of the 28^th Wilder's men tore up the track, destroyed a large amount of stores and telegraph equipment, and blew up the nearby railroad trestle. The next morning they had to ride rapidly eastward to avoid several Confederate cavalry brigades which were sent to capture them. Wilder's men continued to tear up any tracks and burn any stores they came across, and within a few days they had circled the Southern army and safely returned to the Union lines.⁽²⁸⁾

In mid-August the Union army began moving towards the Confederate bastion of Chattanooga. On August 21^st the howitzers of the 18^th Indiana Battery were assigned to guard Harrison's Landing on the river just above the town. The Rebels had used this crossing the year before to force Buell to retreat out of the area. The howitzers did not have to fire on any Rebels, but they did see a large number of them and the presence of Union infantry and artillery at the ford kept the Southerners from trying the flank attack again. The rest of the battery closed on Chattanooga and eventually helped to drive the Confederate garrison from the towns and the forts on its north side.⁽²⁹⁾

From the start of the war the Confederates had fortified and held on to the Cumberland Gap and prevented Yankee armies from easily raiding or invading eastern Tennessee or southwestern Virginia. In late August a Union force was sent to take the pass. The Southern garrison retreated into their fortifications in the Gap and the Yankees surrounded them on September 6^th. The Federals burned a mill and tons of flour which were intended for Southern soldiers. On the evening of September 7^th the Yankees attacked the pickets on the southern side of the pass. They used two rifled guns to fire at the pickets, and two mountain howitzers were used by the Leyden (C. S.) Artillery to engage the attacking Federals. Since it was at night only a few men were wounded on each side. On the morning of the 8^th the Southern guns fired a couple of rounds at the Union force, but stopped when their leaders began talks to surrender the garrison. The vital Confederate hold on the Gap ended with its surrender on September 9^th and allowed the Yankees to raid into the previously untouched regions of eastern Tennessee and southwestern Virginia.⁽³⁰⁾

Mountain howitzers would play an important in one of the few decisive victories that the Confederates gained in the west. A dozen or so howitzers would fight on both sides, including the 18^th Indiana Battery, John Morton's Tennessee Battery, and the 1^st Louisiana Cavalry. The campaign began with Braxton Bragg's Confederates advancing towards William S. Rosecrans's widely scattered Union army. Rosecrans was overly confident that the Southern army would be unable to stand up to the Federal army. He scattered his corps all over the countryside to try and find Bragg's men so that they could destroy the Southern army and end the war quickly. Braxton Bragg planned to destroy Rosecrans's scattered corps in detail. The first clashes were skirmishes between the advance cavalry scouts of both armies. The 18^th Indiana's howitzers fought near Ringgold, Georgia on September 11^th. Wilder's Brigade ran into John Scott's C. S. Cavalry brigade. Wilder had four mountain howitzers and Scott had two howitzers, among other guns. The 92^nd Illinois Mounted Infantry and two of the 18^th's howitzers deployed after they found Scott's men in line to receive them a mile north of Ringgold.

The Southern horsemen outnumbered the Federals and for a while they pushed the Union men back. The rapid fire of the men's repeating rifles and the howitzers stopped the Southerners from moving forward any more. They held until more of Wilder's men and rifled artillery could arrive. The rifled guns of the 18^th Indiana decimated Scott's men and chased them out of the area. Scott lost at least thirteen killed and wounded, compared to only three casualties in the 92^nd Illinois. Bragg's men failed to catch any of Rosecrans's units alone and the Federals saw their danger and rapidly rejoined Rosecrans in one area. The two armies then moved to attack each other head-on. Within a week they would slam into each other along a small river just south of the Tennessee-Georgia border.⁽³¹⁾

Nathan Bedford Forrest was always willing to attack the Yankees given even the slightest opportunity. He led Bragg's advance, and it was Forrest who discovered that the Federal corps were widely scattered giving the Confederates a chance to defeat them in detail. On September 10^th he found two Yankee divisions alone across the Chickamauga River and sent to Braxton Bragg for some infantry to help him destroy these two divisions. After waiting a while he discovered Bragg had marched away without sending him any assistance. Forrest then attacked the two divisions with his cavalry near Tunnel Hill. The Yankees pushed the cavalrymen back for a while, but the range got to be so close and the fighting so intense that Forrest's men were able to repel the Yankees with numerous casualties. This lost chance to destroy part of the Federal army began the feud between Forrest and Bragg which would culminate with threats and the transfer of Forrest at the end of the Battle of Chickamauga.⁽³²⁾

Early on September 18^th the Army of Tennessee resumed its advance on Rosecrans's Federal forces. Rosecrans's had realized his danger after the fighting with Forrest and other Rebel cavalry, and had begun concentrating his army. Forrest's cavalry and howitzers accompanied Bushrod Johnson's infantry at the head of the Confederate advance. Throughout the 18^th Forrest worked to develop the locations and distribution of the enemy army. On the 19^th he advanced towards the Federal-held Reid's Bridge. Here Forrest discovered that the Yankees had retreated a little closer to Chattanooga, so that the town could serve as a place of refuge in event of disaster. Forrest posted his two batteries, including the two mountain howitzers, to shell the enemy near the bridge while he awaited promised infantry support. The guns were deployed to the front of his lines, Forrest's favorite use of artillery, and they decimated several assaults on his position. Promised infantry supports failed to arrive quickly and Forrest's men paid the price, with about one-fourth of the division being killed or wounded. Forrest went back and hustled up Colonel Claudius Wilson's brigade, which promptly attacked and broke through the first two Union defensive lines.

They captured a Yankee artillery battery, but it was soon recovered by a Federal counter-attack. This attack went so far that it almost captured the Southern batteries. The dense forests behind the batteries forced the men to struggle to get the guns between the trees and away from the field. Forrest's men retreated, but the Yankee force had been so badly treated that it was unable or unwilling to pursue him beyond their recovered fortifications. Both sides continued to rush reinforcements to the area. A lack of concentration kept both armies from being able to outnumber and destroy their opponents. Forrest's men held the open ground where they had started the battle and the Army of Tennessee fell into line around them. The Union Army of the Tennessee also rushed to the scene of battle, and spent the evening of the 19^th erecting fortifications that would be the line of the main battle on September 20^th.⁽³³⁾

Forrest's men were the far right of the Confederate line and were under the impression that the battle was to resume at dawn, but it did not resume until 9:30 a.m. Major General John C. Breckenridge's division opened the assault and were stymied by heavy Union fortifications. Forrest then advanced his men, and horse batteries to find and turn the Union flank. Once again the howitzer was proving to be one the best guns for supporting infantry because they could be advanced by hand. While he was skirmishing with the entrenched Federals a separate column was discovered advancing from Rossville. Forrest turned his men and artillery on the new Yankee column. They were able to fight their way past Forrest to the Yankee lines, but it cost them many men. General George Thomas, soon to be famous as "The Rock of Chickamauga," had to send an infantry force to rescue this new column. Morton's guns kept the Yankees from being able to drive off the Southerners, but their fortifications kept the Confederates from routing them. In spite of the destructive power of the mountain howitzers at point-blank range and the fighting strength of Forrest's division the Southern right had only advanced about 600-700 yards by nightfall.

The fighting on the Confederate right had helped to mislead Rosecrans into moving troops around to stop the potential breakthrough of Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry. This inadvertently opened a hole in his right that allowed Longstreet's men to pour through and rout the Union army. Unfortunately for the Confederates, General Thomas continued to hold the Southerners back at Snodgrass Hill, allowing the rest of the Union army to escape back to Chattanooga. At dawn on the 21^st Forrest's division continued the pursuit the fleeing Yankees. Morton's battery was right at the front of the advance. The battery fired a couple of rounds at a rear-guard unit, which fled back to the Union forts. When they neared the town part of his battery exchanged rounds with one of the Federal star forts, and some of its guns fired on several detachments of Federal soldiers. Forrest continually pleaded with Bragg to rush infantry forward and attack the Yankee army before it could regroup, but he was ignored for a variety of reasons and what could have been a total destruction of a Union army slipped through Braxton Bragg's fingers. Eventually Bragg's army arrived and a prolonged siege ensued of the Union garrison.⁽³⁴⁾

By mid-1863 the 18^th Indiana Battery was one of the largest batteries in the Union army with six 3-inch rifled guns and four mountain howitzers. The howitzers were detached from the rest of the battery and accompanied the 92^nd Illinois Mounted Infantry, also of Wilder's command, to another point along the Union line. They were sent to aid King's brigade which was being slowly pushed back by the Southern army. The rapid fire of double-canister decimated several Confederate assaults, firing 778 rounds during the course of the battle. According to Colonel Smith D. Atkins of the 92^nd :

Four mountain howitzers of Lilly's battery were with me on the 19^th, and placed in position by General Reynolds, when I was ordered to dismount. The sergeant in command was wounded and I have no report, but cannot refrain from bearing testimony to the gallant manner in which their guns were manned, convincing me of their effectiveness at short range.⁽³⁵⁾

However, when the Union line began to crumble from the Federal right to left the infantry from King in support of the howitzers ran away. The cannoneers had to fight their way out through the onrushing Southern infantry. They fought so well that they were able to escape with three of the guns and the limber of the fourth howitzer. In the hard fighting at Chickamauga the crew of the 18^th lost two men and six horses killed, and 8 men and 1 horse wounded.⁽³⁶⁾

John S. Scott's Louisiana Cavalry brought its battery of two mountain howitzers and two rifled guns with it when it joined Forrest in his movement on the Yankee army in early September. His 500 dismounted cavalry and the four guns fought with the entrenched Union men for several hours. They helped to push the Federals at the end of the day and pursue them as much as Braxton Bragg would allow. In his report Scott claimed that his brigade disabled one Union gun. They completely exhausted their artillery ammunition in the course of the battle, and withdrew back to the main Confederate lines. On the 21^st they resumed their advance and participated in the seizure of Missionary Ridge and later in the siege of the Union garrison in Chattanooga. In the course of the fighting on the ridge the horsemen and the battery drove off an Ohio infantry regiment from the base of the hill and into the town.⁽³⁷⁾

While part of the Union army was trapped and besieged in Chattanooga, other forces were attempting to take control of eastern Tennessee. Colonel Wolford's mounted brigade was sent to the area near Athens to oppose a Confederate advance from western Virginia and northern Georgia. On September 25^th Robert K. Byrd's brigade was attacked along a small river by a large Southern force of cavalry and artillery. The Federals were flanked and pushed back closer to Athens. Wolford's brigade and Law's Kentucky (U. S.) Battery of mountain howitzers, a part of Wolford's command, rushed to their assistance. The howitzers and Byrd's cannons opened fire on the Confederates, along with the Spencer-carrying 8^th Michigan Cavalry, and drove the Southerners away. Off and on for the next two weeks the Yankees skirmished with the Confederates, but they did not have any large scale engagements after the 25^th and the Federals were not seriously threatened again.⁽³⁸⁾

Bowen's 10^th Missouri (U. S.) Cavalry Battalion fought on April 17^th at the Great Bear Creek in Mississippi. Two cavalry regiments and two mountain howitzers were dispatched on April 14^th from Corinth to Glendale, Mississippi to save a Union outpost under attack by Confederate cavalry and to distract the local Southern garrison from amassing against Abel Streight's raid through Alabama and Georgia. By the time they arrived the garrison had beaten the Confederates and was in pursuit of them, but muddy roads slowed down the pursuit especially the movement of the howitzers. At the Great Bear Creek they found the Confederates dug in to resist them. The howitzers joined other batteries in shelling the Rebels, and covering the cavalry as it forded the creek. The Southerners retreated slowly, fighting all the way. The Yankees pursued them all the way into Alabama. Other Confederates attacked the rear of the Federal force and seized a battery of the First Missouri Light Artillery. The Rebels got away with one of the guns and stopped in a nearby stretch of woods. The howitzer section was brought forward to try and blast the Confederates out of the tree line. The Confederate began to advance in large numbers to attack, and the howitzers joined a section of larger field guns in firing on them. The howitzers helped to break the assault and to drive away the Rebels, but they were unable to recapture the lost artillery piece. The pursuit continued farther into Alabama. At Leighton, Alabama on the 24^th of April the howitzers had to fight again. The battle began at Tuscumbia when part of the 10^th Missouri and their howitzers were positioned in the center of the Union battle line and when the Confederates began retreating the howitzers fired on them to hustle them along. The Federal horsemen pursued them for a mile until they neared Leighton.

Here the Southerners again tried to make a stand. They fired on the Yankees with rifles and a battery of artillery which stopped the Union advance. The howitzers were brought forward, and fired repeatedly at the Southern battery. The Confederate artillery withdrew 500 yards and continued their fire. The howitzers followed them to a very close range, and silenced the enemy battery after a 20-30 minute duel. The Confederates retreated through town, but stopped 4 miles to the east when they had received reinforcements of a cavalry division under the feared horsemen Nathan Bedford Forrest. The Yankees retreated to Tuscumbia the next morning rather than face Forrest. The Federals moved back into Mississippi and marched to attack the supply depot at Tupelo. On May 5^th 600 Confederate infantry drew up outside of the town and the Yankees moved to assault them. The howitzers were placed on a small hill to the west of Tupelo, and opened fire on the Confederates. Two Southern regiments attacked the Federals and the battle see-sawed back and forth, at one time coming close to the howitzers and the Confederates almost seized the guns. The battery cut down many Confederates and helped the Yankees to eventually win. The Federals burned all weapons and stores that they found, and returned to their home base at Corinth.⁽³⁹⁾

A battery of mountain howitzers participated in Streight's Raid through Alabama and Georgia from April 30^th - May 3^rd. The Federal leader had devised a plan to raid supply and communication centers, especially the main depot at Rome, Georgia, behind Braxton Bragg's front lines. They hoped to force him to retreat from his strong entrenchments in Tennessee and into weaker positions in northern Georgia. Almost 2,000 mounted Union infantry and a section of two mountain howitzers departed northern Mississippi on April 24^th to burn their way through Alabama and Georgia. The "Wizard of the Saddle" Nathan Bedford Forrest was sent to stop this Yankee force. Forrest had to oppose one of the cover raids under Granville Dodge in northern Alabama, but he figured out it was a decoy and soon set out after Streight. On April 30^th Forrest attacked Streight's camp at Day's Gap in north central Alabama, but Streight was already moving eastward. Forrest doggedly pursued him for the next three and a half days over 150 miles. Both groups continued pushing with little rest, and losing many men along the way as their horses or mules gave out. Often Forrest was slowed by the fire of Streight's two howitzers, but he never stopped hounding the rear-guard of the Federal force. The two groups fought almost continually during the dispute.

At the Alabama/Georgia border Streight's luck finally ran out. Reports reached him exaggerating Forrest's numbers, claiming a large Georgia militia force was between him and the main target of Rome, and that much of their ammunition had been soaked and therefore ruined when they were crossing the Black Warrior River and Big Will's Creek. Forrest showed nearby and met with Streight to demand his surrender, while in the background his men and cannons rode in circles to make it appear that there were more Southern soldiers nearby than there actually were. Forrest was outnumbered almost 2-to-1 and had lost two cannons earlier to Streight, but he fooled Streight into surrendering. Streight's two howitzers joined Forrest's command and fought with him throughout much of the rest of the war.⁽⁴⁰⁾

The 10^th Missouri Battalion shelled Confederates at Florence, Alabama on May 28^th. Florence Cornyn's mounted brigade left Corinth, Mississippi on May 26^th on a raid into northern Alabama. They rode continuously for two days and early on the 28^th they finally encountered their first Southern opposition. They advanced to within 800 yards of Florence, and were stopped by increased resistance of the infantrymen and two Confederate artillery pieces. Cornyn ordered up two of the four mountain howitzers of the 10^th Missouri. The small guns fired only five or six rounds before the Confederate guns withdrew. The rest of the Southerners were quickly driven all the way through the town.

The Yankees found 30,000 rounds of rifle ammunition and 5,000 rounds of canister which were quickly destroyed. The Federals also burned a blacksmith and wagon-wheel works in Florence. After two hours Cornyn's brigade marched south on their return. The Confederates attacked the rear of the column constantly, until stopped by the Yankees who burned down a bridge over a large creek. On their trip back to Corinth the Federal cavalrymen burned several more textile works, and large amounts of cotton and foodstuffs. They returned safely to Corinth on May 31^st.⁽⁴¹⁾

After the surrender of the Confederate bastion of Vicksburg on July 4^th the Union army began expanding the area it controlled and trying to destroy any Confederate supply depots or railroad equipment. Multiple columns were sent in various directions to attack any Southern forces they could find. One column, a cavalry division under General Peter Osterhaus, marched towards nearby Jackson, Mississippi, a railroad crossroads. It included two mountain howitzers attached to the 6^th Missouri (U. S.) Cavalry. On the evening of July 8^th, at the junction of the Jackson Road and the Raymond and Bolton Road, the Yankees met stiffening resistance from a Confederate division. Continually skirmishing with the Federals the Southern cavalry contested every foot of ground on the road to Jackson.

Several times the howitzers were brought forward, and their fire was credited with often forcing the Rebels out of their positions. Late in the evening the Yankees found the most of the Confederate division drawn up in line-of-battle to stop the Federal advance. The position was chosen so that the Union soldiers could only attack from the front. The howitzers opened fire and the 6^th Missouri charged, and between the two the Southerners broke and ran without much of a fight.

Early on the morning of July 9^th Osterhaus's men occupied Clinton and found the Southerners awaiting them one mile outside of the town. The cavalry dismounted and moved forward, while the howitzers fired on the Confederate lines. The Rebel cavalry hung on tenaciously, but were forced to retreat by the volume of the Yankee fire. The Union cavalrymen pursued them to a nearby stretch of woods and stopped to fight. This time the howitzers could not force them out of the positions, and a Southern battery was brought forward to attack the Union guns. Osterhaus had to order the howitzers to pull back until longer-range guns could be brought forward. With infantry and artillery arriving, and Union cavalry threatening their flanks, the Southerners withdrew once again.

On July 13^th Osterhaus's division had closed to within a few miles of Jackson, and occupied it without a fight on the 17^th. On July 21^st the cavalry followed the march of the XIII Corps towards the Big Black River and back to Vicksburg. The howitzers had enabled the cavalry to destroy tons of Confederate supplies, miles of railroad and irreplaceable train locomotives and cars.⁽⁴²⁾

Union forces in the area of Corinth, Mississippi were continually plagued by Southern cavalry units which always fled when confronted, but always returned after the Federal forces had left the area. One such unit had returned to the region of Jacinto, south of Corinth. One Union cavalry force consisting of the 5^th Ohio Cavalry, a mounted infantry company and four mountain howitzers patrolled the region on a regular basis to chase off any guerillas. They skirmished at Jacinto, Mississippi on September 7^th. The Rebels did not put up much of a fight and fled after only a few rounds. This cycle of skirmish and flight continued throughout much of the rest of the war.⁽⁴³⁾

On September 27^th Colonel Edward Winslow led a force of 900 men of the 4^th Iowa, 10^th Missouri, and the 4^th, 5^th and 11^th Illinois Cavalries out of the town of Vicksburg. They were dispatched on a raid from the Union-held area around Vicksburg to destroy Confederate supplies, communications and railroads. The Union force began pursuing a Southern cavalry brigade that was in the area and had skirmished with Federal horsemen on various occasions. When Winslow learned that the Rebels had retreated towards Livingston and Jackson he crossed the Big Black River at Moore's Ford to chase them. He left behind one regiment and one of the guns to guard the ford. At dawn on September 29^th the rest of the Federal force was attacked by a large number of the enemy and four cannons. The howitzer with Winslow's main force was quickly disabled, but was placed in a wagon and taken back to the Federal lines. After just an hour of fighting the Confederates broke off and the Yankees were able to continue on their way. The Southerners continued to nip at the flanks of Winslow's force, but were too weak to risk a general engagement with the larger Yankee brigade. In 96 hours Winslow's men had moved 126 miles, captured eight Rebels, destroyed 50 rifles, captured 100 horses and 50 mules, all this while losing only 2 men captured and none wounded.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Major General Joe Wheeler had led a large number of Southern horsemen on a raid behind Union lines in late September. On October 3^rd Wheeler's men forced the 600-man garrison of McMinnville to surrender and spent the following day destroying Union stores and railroads. Many brigades were rushed to catch and destroy Wheeler's raiders. Wilder's brigade was the lead Union element racing towards the captured depot and began fighting with the rear-guard of Wheeler's force. They skirmished with them for quite a distance, but the Southerners were leaving so quickly that the Union artillery had a hard time just keeping up with their pursuing cavalry brigade, much less getting to fire any rounds at the scattered and retreating Rebels. Seven miles west of town the Yankees had driven the Confederate rear-guard into their main body so the Southerners had to make a stand at the edge of a nearby forest.

Wilder's brigade dismounted and formed to attack, while Captain Eli Lilly, founder of the 18^th and the Eli Lilly Pharmaceutical Company one of the largest American pharmaceutical companies today, and the 18^th Indiana Battery positioned itself a half mile from the Rebel lines. All of the battery's guns opened fire, and after 30 rounds the Southerners fled from the field. While it was an extreme range for the mountain howitzers, Lilly was not one to let a gun sit idle when it could be flinging cannon rounds at the enemy. The rest of the brigade continued its pursuit for another 2 miles until darkness ended the pursuit. The brigade had marched 30 miles and had successfully fought a long, continuous running-fight with Wheeler's tough veteran horsemen. The artillery helped to end the resistance by the Rebels, and sped up their flight from the region.⁽⁴⁵⁾

The 9^th Illinois Cavalry used howitzers at Lamar, Tennessee on October 6^th. Four howitzers attached to the 9^th were dispatched from La Grange, Tennessee with 730 men of the 3^rd and 9^th Illinois Cavalries to attempt to block Confederate cavalryman James Chalmers's raid on Union rail lines. When the Federal commanders learned that Chalmers's and 2,500 horsemen were moving to destroy their small force on the south side of the Coldwater River they were ordered to move to and hold the depot town of Lamar, Tennessee. While the Yankees were crossing the river at dawn on October 6^th the Southerners attacked the advance pickets on the north side of the river. They hoped to be able to cross to the far side and attack Federal rail and supply depots. The howitzers were rushed to the north side to prevent the Rebels from reaching the ford and blocking the Federal movement. According to Colonel La Fayette McCrillis, "Chalmers' battalion charged in column to gain the ford, but were driven back in great confusion and with considerable loss by a few well-directed shells." The battery fired 32 rounds in the short, brisk engagement. Chalmers let the Yankees keep the ford and moved to another one located three miles to the east at Lockhart's Mill. The Yankees retreated to the intersection of the Collierville and La Fayette roads at Mount Pleasant. They expected the Southerners to attack them, but they waited all day for nothing. In that time Chalmers's brigade had continued towards La Grange, Tennessee and the small Federal force picked up the pursuit at midnight of the 6^th. They were left far behind by the fast-moving Rebels and had no more engagements with them in this raid.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Braxton Bragg sent large portions of his cavalry to destroy Union lines of communication and resupply after his victory at Chickamauga. Federal leaders sent various garrisons out to stop the raiders. Two of the mounted opponents ran into each other near Shelbyville, Tennessee around 10:00 a.m. on October 7^th. One regiment of George Hodge's Confederate Cavalry Division was hard pressed, so the rest of the brigade and its two attached mountain howitzers rushed to their aid. John Scott, of the 1^st Louisiana Cavalry, had his brigade routed by the hard fighting Yankees. Hodge was able to keep his men together and to rally some of Scott's men. He formed then behind a fence running perpendicular to the Shelbyville road, and they fired a point-blank volley at the onrushing Federals. The Union horsemen were checked by this volley and the wounding of 30 or so men. Hodge brought up all of his men and the two cannons in this momentary lull in the fighting. The guns and the men fired into the Yankees again and again, but the Federals brought forward three longer-range artillery pieces and forced Hodge to retreat. Hodge fought a long, slow and controlled holding action against the numerically superior Union brigade, but many of his men and horses were wounded and killed.

At 3:00 p.m. Hodge was ordered by Joe Wheeler to retreat to the new, Southern defensive line, and he continued on through Farmington to cross the Tennessee River at Muscle Shoals. George Hodge's brigade had lost one-third of its men, but he credited the howitzer battery with doing "terrible execution with their guns on the enemy." Wheeler's new line was eventually broken and they were pursued all the way to the Tennessee River and the main Confederate lines.⁽⁴⁷⁾

After trapping William Rosecrans's army in Chattanooga, and feuding with his own lieutenants, Bragg sent James Longstreet, the 1^st Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia and a portion of the Army of Tennessee to destroy Ambrose Burnside and the Union army around Knoxville. Burnside's army was scattered all over eastern Tennessee. 1,200 cavalrymen and six mountain howitzers were headquartered at Philadelphia, Tennessee. On October 20^th part of Longstreet's command moving from southwestern Virginia attacked this force and routed them rather easily. The Rebels captured all six of the howitzers and a large portion of the force's wagon train. This Southern command advanced only a little farther into eastern Tennessee and was eventually chased back into Virginia. However, when they retreated they took all of their captured stores and cannons with them.⁽⁴⁸⁾

On November 3^rd Collierville, Tennessee was occupied by the 3^rd Cavalry Brigade attached to the 16^th Corps to try and stop the raid of James Chalmers's Southern Cavalry Division. The brigade was scattered over fifty miles of road to guard railroad bridges and discover in which direction Chalmers was moving. They had two iron howitzers with the 8^th Illinois Cavalry, four mountain howitzers of the First Illinois Light Artillery and two with the 2^nd Iowa Cavalry. Early on the 3^rd the pickets of the 8^th Illinois were attacked by Rebel horsemen eight miles south of Collierville. The 8^th pulled back to their fortifications around the town and awaited reinforcements. The exploding shells and double canister of the two howitzers helped to keep the Southerners at bay. The 2^nd Iowa moved in on foot to attack the rear of the Confederates assaulting the town and their howitzers were placed in the center of their line. A brigade was sent to attack the 2^nd and the howitzers cut many of them down. A few of the Rebels reached the guns, but they had little support and were quickly killed or captured.

At the same time the 1^st Illinois Light Artillery reached a ridge to the east of the town while they were under heavy fire and many of their horses were killed. In spite of the losses of horses the artillerymen moved the guns into position by hand and opened canister fire on Chalmers's right flank. Soon the Rebels pulled back to escape the devastating fire of the mountain howitzers. Chalmers turned his attention from the town to drive off the pesky cavalry brigade. The 2^nd Iowa and its howitzers were formed on the right, followed by the 7^th Illinois and the 6^th Illinois, and the 1^st Illinois Artillery on the left. The Yankees attacked before the Rebels could move very far and soon drove them from the field with little resistance. The howitzers took out many of the Southerners. They pursued Chalmers southward, but were stopped eight miles south by Southern fortifications and nightfall ended the fighting. The Yankees captured 57 Confederates, injured a number and collected a number of abandoned side-arms. The howitzers kept Chalmers's men from seizing the town and others helped to drive the Southerners from the field. The stand of the 3^rd Brigade stopped Chalmers's raid and saved the Union railroads and bridges that were the raid's target.⁽⁴⁹⁾

In mid-November U. S. Grant began sending troops to relieve the besieged garrison of Knoxville. One of the lead units was Wilder's Mounted Brigade and the ten-gun 18^th Indiana Battery. Rains delayed the advance of the rescuers so that they did not approach Knoxville until mid-December. By this time Longstreet had given up on the siege and withdrew his men to the Morristown/Rogersville area. The cavalry from the Army of the Ohio was sent to attack Longstreet's cavalry. Wilder's Brigade was sent to aid the horsemen and the 18^th's long-range guns were a welcome addition to the Army of the Ohio's Cavalry, which had only four mountain howitzers. The Union horsemen and their artillery skirmished constantly with the retreating Southerners, but the Yankees were more than content to see Longstreet just leave the area around Knoxville. In their own exhaustion they did not press him and his soldiers too hard.⁽⁵⁰⁾

The cavalry was not allowed to go into winter quarters with the rest of the Union army. Instead, they continually raided and skirmished with Longstreet's Confederates during the winter months. Two sections of the 18^th Indiana, including one of mountain howitzers, accompanied a brigade to Dandridge, Tennessee on December 24^th. They had seized the town with little resistance, but the Southerners began attacking them in force soon after that. Two Rebel cavalry brigades surrounded the Yankees in the town. They attacked the Union horsemen, but were beaten off by the fire of the Federal repeating rifles and their artillery long before the Southerners got anywhere near the town of Dandridge. The destruction of these attacks allowed the Federals to retreat to New Market without any more interference.⁽⁵¹⁾

On December 29^th the Army of the Ohio's cavalry, some infantry detachments and part of the 18^th Indiana Battery, in all about 2,500 men, were sent to attack a Confederate brigade foraging in the area around Dandridge. Early on the 30^th the Federal horsemen discovered three Southern divisions, around 6,000 men, awaiting them halfway to Dandridge. The Union artillery was placed in the edge of the nearby forest along the Mossy Creek to await the Southerner's attack. The battle began around 11:00 a.m. when the Rebels moved forward. The Yankee guns cut down many of the men, but the Southerners continued to press forward. The fire of the Union repeating-rifles and the artillery stopped the Confederates before they got very close to the Federal lines. After this repulse the Southerners extended their lines so that they overlapped the Union left. Yankee infantry and cavalry charged the extending Southerners, captured 25 of them, and ended their plans to encircle the Union flank. For a while the fighting subsided other than Confederate artillery shelling their Union counterparts.

The Confederates shifted to the Union right and attacked it. However, they were quickly and easily repulsed. All day long the Rebels assaulted various points along the Union lines, but were repulsed by the intense fire of the artillery, including that of six howitzers with the Army of Ohio's cavalry and those with the 18^th Indiana. Southern sharpshooters played with devastating effect on the Yankee artillerymen, and after three hours only two or three men remained able to work with each gun of the 18^th Indiana Battery.

Slowly the Yankees withdrew several miles, cautiously pursued by the Southern cavalry. Around 3:00 p.m. Union reinforcements attacked the Southerners's left flank and quickly broke them. This short battle was quite intense for what was essentially a division-level fight. The artillery had kept the outnumbered Federals from being overwhelmed by the veteran Southern horsemen. The 18^th Indiana's three guns fired a combined total of 512 rounds and this detail suffered casualties of ten of the fifty men it took into the fight. The Federals suffered a total of 17 killed, 87 injured and 5 missing, and reports indicated that the Southerners suffered around twice as many.⁽⁵²⁾

In mid-February Nathan Bedford Forrest continued his relentless attacks on numerous Union posts throughout northern Mississippi. One of the scattered Yankee detachments was driven towards Okolona, Mississippi, the main Union stronghold in the area. During the night of February 21^st two Southern brigades neared the town. On the 22^nd mountain howitzers clashed as Morton's Tennessee Battery exchanged fire with Perkin's U.S. Battery and the 4^th Missouri (U. S.) Cavalry. Bell's Brigade of Forrest's cavalry was cut off from the rest of Forrest's command, so he rushed to save them and crush the opposing Yankee army. The fire of Morton's battery helped to drive the Federal soldiers away from Bell's men and into their works around the town. The Union soldiers left behind several pieces of artillery. The six mountain howitzers of Perkin's U. S. Battery were forced off the road in the panic, but their carriages broke and the guns had to be spiked and left behind. Forrest's men were after revenge for the murder of one of their captains by the 4^th U. S. Regulars earlier in the war and they furiously attacked the Yankees as they retreated from Okolona. Soon what had started out as an orderly retreat turned into a panicked rout. A few miles from town some of the Yankees made a stand with a large number of rallied infantry and their remaining artillery. This included the mountain howitzers of the 4^th Missouri Cavalry. 1,200 Southerners, with only a couple of batteries in support, attacked the entrenched Yankees, carrying the first line easily. The second line stopped Forrest's men in their first assault, but a second attack broke the Union defensive line. This ended any serious attempts by the Union army to stop him on this day.

In their first engagement the Missouri howitzers helped to stop Forrest's pursuit for a short time. Morton's artillery was always to the front in the pursuits and the attacks, and his guns weakened the Yankees so that the outnumbered Rebels could break them. One of the 4^th Missouri's howitzers was spiked and abandoned when its carriage broke, but the rest of the battery survived to fight another day. On the evening of the 22^nd the pursuit was handed over to fresh Confederates, ending the battle for Morton's battery and Forrest's horsemen. General Smith, the Union commander, admits in his report that he had 5,000 men to oppose Forrest, at least two to one odds in the Union's favor. In spite of these advantages the Yankees were routed by Forrest's rapid attacks with howitzers in the front lines, and by his tough reputation. Forrest's cavalry had driven the Yankees over 50 miles in two days, and caused around a thousand to be killed, wounded or captured.⁽⁵³⁾

In late May the Union forces in eastern Kentucky began advancing on nearby Confederates, both to protect the flank of John Schofield's Union army and to provide a diversion for the advance of Sherman's main force. On May 27^th General Stephen Burbridge left Louisa, Kentucky with the 39^th Kentucky Mounted Infantry, the 11^th Michigan Cavalry and its two mountain howitzers. At the mouth of the Beaver River the Yankees planned to halt to erect a small fort that would help stop any raids by fast-moving Southern raiders. They found none of the expected forage so they were forced to return to Louisa. On June 4^th the 45^th Kentucky (U. S.) Infantry was forced out of Pound Gap by a large Southern force moving on the Virginia side of the mountains. When Burbridge learned the next day that John Hunt Morgan, with reportedly 5,000 men, was moving through the abandoned gap he advanced with all the men he could find, including the mountain howitzers of the 11^th Michigan and the 1^st Kentucky Light Artillery, Battery C. Burbridge planned to move in behind Morgan and attacking him from behind. He soon learned that Morgan's men knew the territory intimately, and could not be attacked with any appreciable amount of surprise. He left parts of the 52^nd and 37^th Kentucky Infantries to hold Pound Gap should Morgan return that way.

Early on June 8^th Burbridge took up a direct pursuit of Morgan with the most-rested horses of his command and two of the mountain howitzers. At dawn on June 10^th he caught up with Morgan, who had just taken the small garrison at Mount Sterling. The plan called for a dismounted assault with the two howitzers as part of the mounted reserve, but one of the guns was mistakenly run forward to the front lines. The gun blocked the road and prevented the Yankees from completely surprising and possibly routing Morgan's raiders. Its horses were quickly killed, and it was captured before the men could even try to roll it away by hand. The 12^th Ohio Cavalry rushed to retake the piece, and quickly did after some very hard hand-to-hand fighting. The Federals pursued them for several miles, until Morgan's men realized how small the Yankee force truly was. The Yankees dug in and, with the help of the remaining howitzer, repulsed the Southern horsemen after an hour and a half of intense fighting. Fearing Morgan would return with a detached portion of his command and help his men to rout the small Union force, Burbridge headed to Lexington with his wounded and the prisoners early on the 11^th.

Here he learned that Morgan had already left the town, so he planned his pursuit with reinforcements from George Stoneman's cavalry division. Burbridge mounted as many as he could on fresh horses. They departed early on the 12^th, skirmishing often with Morgan's men, but they were never able to bring Morgan to any pitched battle. By the late on the 13^th Morgan was safely back within Southern lines. The howitzers in this campaign faced the same problems that all artillery did when opposing the fast-moving Southern raiders. If they could not catch up to any large force than there was nothing for the artillery to break so that the Yankee horsemen could finish them off. Artillery fire is wasted when dealing with the spread-out skirmishers that they spent most of their time fighting with on these raids.⁽⁵⁴⁾

William T. Sherman dispatched Brigadier General Samuel Sturgis and several thousand men in early May to find and destroy Nathan Bedford Forrest and his troublesome raiders. They were also assigned to burn several major depots, especially those in Tupelo, Mississippi. Forrest skirmished with them, and retreated, all the while assembling enough men to destroy Sturgis's command. Forrest decided he had to fight to save the massive amount of stores that were at Tupelo. He decided to make a stand at the intersection of the Baldwin-Pontotoc and Ripley-Guntown Roads, better known as Brice's Crossroads. He planned to get the Union cavalry far ahead of their infantry, destroy them and then fall on the tired infantry as it rushed forward to save their horsemen. Both sides had to deal with roads which had been turned into seas of mud by recent rains, and made it next to impossible to move guns or wagons. Even the light mountain howitzers were sinking up to their axles. The battle began early on June 10^th with the numerically superior Yankees driving back Forrest's men. Among the Federal horsemen were the 4^th Missouri Cavalry and two mountain howitzers. According to their commander they fired 112 rounds during the course of the day from their position in the front lines with the Union's skirmishers. They helped stop several assaults by Forrest's men, and caused them to retreat. Just at this moment John Morton's two batteries, including two howitzers, arrived on the field after a herculean effort to move the pieces through the deep mud. The Federals were being forced back by the rapid fire of the Southern horsemen, but their infantry support was beginning to arrive on the field. The Confederate cannon were placed on a nearby hill and poured a destructive fire into the ranks of the Federals.

They cut gaping holes in the Union lines, and quickly silenced the fire of two Yankee artillery pieces which were the first large guns to succeed in reaching the field. Soon the Federals broke and raced for the rear in a panic. The two Union guns, 3-inch Rodman rifles, were captured in the panic and Morton's battery quickly exchanged its two mountain howitzers for them, making their battery a four-gun set of Rodmans, and turned the guns on their former owners. The 4^th Missouri escaped with its two howitzers. Many of the Federals fled for the bridge over the Tishomingo Creek, and the tangled mass of men, horses, and wagons were cut to pieces by the amazingly accurate fire of Forrest's two batteries. The pursuit was ended by darkness, but Forrest had captured hundreds of men and scored one of his most decisive victories of the war. The howitzers had poured out a veritable hail of lead that cut down large numbers of men on both sides, but when they faced larger guns they were soon silenced and many of their gunners were killed or wounded. Howitzers were at their best in hit-and-run attacks, and even when they were used by skilled artillerists, such as John Morton, they were usually devastated by the larger guns before they ever got close enough to return fire. Artillerists who liked these guns all eventually gave them up when they could get bigger and better guns, such as Rodmans or Napoleons. Even proponents of the howitzer were not suicidal enough to get in artillery duels with longer range guns if they could help it.⁽⁵⁵⁾

The Macbeth (South Carolina) Light Artillery used a howitzer at Morristown, Tennessee on October 28^th. Late on the night of the 27^th the howitzer was sent to General Vaughn's cavalry at Morristown. Early the next day the howitzer was rushed to where the Yankees were attacking Vaughn's lines. It opened fire on the Federal skirmishers at 600 yards, around its best effective range, and chased them back to their main lines. The solitary fire of the small gun did not slow the Union army down and it kept pressing the horsemen back. Soon the gun had used up all of its ammunition, except a few rounds of canister, so it was ordered to retire past the town to resupply. Before they could return the Southern horsemen had begun to retreat from the town with the Federals right on their heels. The sergeant commanding the howitzer tried to save it, but the cavalry stampeded and their artillery blocked the only road. The howitzer helped slow the Union advance, but superior numbers and firearms quickly routed the Southern cavalry force, and the howitzer and six of the eight crewmen were captured. ⁽⁵⁶⁾

The 5^th Regiment, United States Veteran Reserve Infantry, used howitzers at Camp Morton, Indiana from January to the end of the war to guard Confederate prisoners. Around 4,000 prisoners and several tons of Government property were at the camp. A full six-gun battery of mountain howitzers helped the veterans keep the prisoners in line and safeguard the stores.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Mountain howitzers are not known to have been used in any combat in 1865 in this theater. As in the east they were replaced with the numerous longer-range guns. Even people who liked the guns, such as Nathan Bedford Forrest, were giving the howitzers up for the bigger guns. The small guns were then either melted down to make bigger guns or they were sent to small depots to serve as additional firepower in Confederate defensive lines.

1. Report of Colonel C. C. Marsh, undated, OR, ser. I, vol. 3, (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1881), p. 419.

2. Stephen B. Oates, Confederate Cavalry West of the River (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), p. 26.

3. Sandusky Bay Tourism Web Site. Available at: http://www.sanduskyweb.com/sand_jonisland.html. 1 May 1997.

4. Larry J. Daniel, Cannoneers in Gray: The Field Artillery of the Army of Tennessee, 1861-1865 (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 21-22.

5. Colonel James S. Scott to General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, 1 May 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 10, pt. 1, (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1884), p. 878.

6. Quoted in Dee A. Brown, Morgan's Raiders (New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1959), p. 81.

7. Brown, Morgan's Raiders, p. 81-84.

8. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel N. Wood to General Cadwallader C. Washburn, 25 July 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 13, pp. 174-76.

9. Brigadier General Patrick R. Cleburne to Major General Edmund K. Smith, 1 September 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, pt. 1, (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1886), p. 945.

10. Brigadier General Patrick R. Cleburne to Major General Edmund K. Smith, 1 September 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, pt. 1, pp. 946-47.

11. Colonel John T. Wilder to Captain J. E. Stacy, 18 September 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 16, pt. 1, pp. 960-64. Also, Brigadier General James R. Chalmers to Major Huger, 15 September 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 16, pt. 1, pp. 972-83. These reports describe the battle from the points-of-view of the opposing commanders.

12. Brown, Morgan's Raiders, pp. 121 and 127-29.

13. Ibid, pp. 133-35.

14. Brigadier General John H. Morgan to Colonel George W. Brent, 9 December 1862, OR, ser. I, vol. 20, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1887), pp. 66-69.

15. Brown, Morgan's Raiders, pp. 149-51. Also, Brigadier General John H. Morgan to Colonel George W. Brent, 8 March 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 20, pt. 1, pp. 156-59.

16. John W. Morton, The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry (Marietta, GA: R. Bemis Publishing, Ltd., 1995), pp. 61-71.

17. Morton, The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry, pp. 75-78.

18. Albert Underwood, Albert Underwood Civil War Diary. Found at Albert Underwood Civil War Diary Web Site. Available: http://dcwi.com/~dave/underwood3.html. 21 May 1998.

19. Report of Brigadier General Hugh W. Mercer, 30 March 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 14, (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1885), pp. 872-875. Also, Major General Benjamin Huger to Colonel Josiah Gorgas, 31 March 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 14, pp. 854-59.

20. John W. Morton, The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry (Marietta, GA: R. Bemis Publishing, Ltd., 1995) pp. 82-84.

21. Colonel Robert H. G. Minty to Captain Sinclair, 21 March 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 23, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1889), pp. 160-61.

22. Henry M. Cist, Campaigns of the Civil War; Vol. VII: The Army of the Cumberland (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), p. 36.

23. Report of Major General Quincy A. Gillmore, 1 November 1865, OR, ser. I, vol. 23, pt. 1, pp. 168-171.

24. John W. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen: Through the Civil War with Eli Lilly's Indiana Battery (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1975), pp. 70-71.

25. Colonel August V. Kautz to Major S. A. Gratz, 11 June 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 23, pt. 1, pp. 372-74.

26. John M. Harrell and John Dimitry, Confederate Military History, Vol. X: Louisiana And Arkansas (Secaucus, NJ: The Blue & Grey Press, 1974), pp. 177-78.

27. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, pp. 76-84.

28. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, pp. 84-87.

29. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, pp. 94-99.

30. First Lieutenant P. D. Hunter to Brigadier General Josiah Gorgas, 24 March 1865, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1890), pp. 633-35.

31. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, pp. 104-05. Also, Colonel Smith D. Atkins to Captain Alexander A. Rice, 16 September 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1890), pp. 454-56.

32. Morton, The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry, pp. 112-14.

33. Morton, The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry, pp. 115-20.

34. Morton, The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry, pp. 115-30. Also, Daniel, Cannoneers in Gray, pp. 105-06.

35. Colonel Smith D. Atkins to Captain Alexander A. Rice, 27 September 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 1, pp. 458.

36. Report of Captain Eli Lilly, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 1, pp. 466-67. Also, Colonel Smith D. Atkins to Captain Alexander Rice, 27 September 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 1, pp. 456-58.

37. Colonel John S. Scott, 24 September 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 2, pp. 531-33.

38. Colonel Robert K. Byrd to Lieutenant Colonel G. B. Drake, 9 October 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 2, pp. 588-89.

39. Colonel Florence M. Cornyn to Captain George E. Spencer, 16 May 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 23, pt. 1, pp. 252-59.

40. Cornelia Weller and Jac Weller, "Effective Pursuit: How Forrest Captured Streight, 30 April - 3 May 1863," Confederate Veteran, September-October, 1994, pp. 23-34.

41. Colonel Florence M. Cornyn to Brigadier General Grenville M. Dodge, 2 June 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 23, pt. 1, pp. 350-52.

42. Brigadier General Peter J. Osterhaus to Lieutenant Colonel Walter B. Scates, 25 July 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 24, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1889), pp. 581-84.

43. Brigadier General Eugene A. Carr to Lieutenant Colonel Henry Binmore, 7 September 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 3 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1890), pp. 405-06.

44. Colonel Edward F. Winslow to Captain R. M. Sawyer, 1 October 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 2, pp. 661-62.

45. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, pp. 130-31.

46. Colonel La Fayette McCrillis to Lieutenant W. P. Callon, 17 October 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 2, pp. 745-46.

47. Report of Colonel George B. Hodge, 11 October 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 30, pt. 2, pp. 728-29.

48. Major General Ambrose Burnside to Major General U. S. Grant, 20 October 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 31, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1890), p. 680.

49. Colonel Edward Hatch to Captain T. H. Harris, 9 November 1863, OR, ser. I, vol. 31, pt. 1, pp. 245-46.

50. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, pp. 150-53.

51. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, pp. 154-57.

52. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, pp. 158-65.

53. Morton, The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry, pp. 149-56. Also, Thomas S. Cogley, History of the Seventh Indiana Cavalry Volunteers (Dayton, OH: Morningside House, Inc., 1991), pp. 92-98. Major Gustav Heinrichs to Lieutenant A. Vezin, 17 March 1864, OR, ser. I, vol. 32, pt. 1(Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1891), pp. 279-81. These three records detail the fighting of howitzers on both sides in the battle.

54. Brigadier General Stephen G. Burbridge to , 1 August 1864, OR, ser. I, vol. 39, pt. 1, pp. 23-27. Also, Colonel Charles Hanson to Brigadier General Nathaniel McLean, 8 July 1864, OR, ibid., pp. 39-44.

55. Morton, The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry, pp. 173-77. Also, Board of Investigation Interview of Colonel G. E. Waring, 18 July 1864, OR, ser. I, vol. 39, pt. 1, pp. 191-94.

56. Sergeant A. B. Byrd to Captain B. A. Jeter, 3 November 1864, OR, ser. I, vol. 39, pt. 1, pp. 857-58.

57. Captain J. W. DeForest to Brigadier General James B. Fry, 30 November 1865, OR, ser. III, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U. S. GPO, 1900), p. 561.